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THE CLEAN AIR ACT:
"TAKING A STICK TO THE STATES"
T HE CLEAN Am Aer AMENDMENTS OF 19701 were designed to allevi-
ate the ineffectiveness of earlier legislation which delegated respon-
sibility for the control of air pollution almost exclusively to the states.
Until 1970 the initiative for the setting and implementation of clean
air standards rested entirely with the states. 2  By late 1970 only ten
states had set standards and none had plans to implement those stan-
dards.3 Partly because of the states' unresponsive attitude, it was felt
that a "drastic revision" 4 in the approach to air pollution control would
be necessary to overcome some of the problems with the earlier legisla-
tion. Congress also recognized that uniformity among state standards
for air quality was desirable for several reasons. Perhaps the primary
reason was the acknowledgment by Congress that the protection of the
public health was its responsibility. 5 It was also anticipated that na-
tionwide standards would eliminate the duplication of research caused
when each state developed its own standards. Finally, Congress hoped
to relieve some of the pressure being exerted by industry upon the states
to set low air quality standards.6 By locating the responsibility for
determining the standard of air quality at the federal level, Congress in-
tended to speed up the process of pollution control.
In the words of Justice Rehnquist, "Congress reacted by taking a
stick to the States in the form of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970.
.7 The result was a comprehensive piece of legislation aimed at
achieving a nationally set level of air quality within a prescribed period
of time, while leaving the primary responsibility for implementation of
I Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a (1970). In the following notes, unless other-
wise specified, Clean Air Act refers to Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858a, as
amended through 1970.
2 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857-1858a (1970)). This was the immediate predecessor to the Clean Air Act Amend-
ments of 1970. For a discussion of pre-1970 legislation, see Note, Clean Air Act Amend-
mentts of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 Go. L.J. 153, 154-59 (1972).
3 116 CONG. REC. 32,916 (1970).
4 The Fourth Circuit used the words "a drastic revision" to describe the overhaul
undertaken by Congress in the formulation of the Clean Air Act of 1970. Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 497 (4th Cir. 1973).
5 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970):
Although the nature of the attack will differ from region to region, one objective
will be the same: Air quality standards protective of the health of persons must be
achieved within the 3-year period of the approval of plans to implement ambient
air quality standards. The right of States to set more stringent standards of air
quality has been preserved.
6 "Finally, by removing standard-setting authority from the states, Congress was re-
acting to indications that large industries were able to pressure states into setting low air
standards." Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61
GEO. L.J. 153, 157 (1972).
- Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 64 (1975). This was
the Supreme Court's first interpretation of the Clean Air Act of 1970. For a further
discussion of the case see note 10 infra.
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this national standard with the states.8  In the years since its passage,
the Clean Air Act has had its goals seriously challenged by the energy
crisis,9 and the Supreme Court has had several opportunities to inter-
pret the Act.' 0 In addition, congressional committees have recently
submitted wide ranging proposals to amend the Act." It seems appro-
priate at this stage in the Act's history to consider the degree of success
attained by this novel piece of legislation.
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act of 1970,
this Note will first examine how one heavily industrialized state has
responded to "having a stick taken to it." Additionally, the federal-
state relations which have resulted from the shift in emphasis from state
to federal control, and industry's onslaught on the courts for judicial re-
view of actions taken by both federal and state agencies will be exam-
8 Section 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1970) provides that: "[T]he prevention
and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments."
9 In response to the oil embargo and resulting energy crisis of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §
1857c-10, entitled "Authority to deal with energy shortage," was added to the Clean Air
Act. This section authorized a temporary suspension of regulations for a period of ap-
proximately one year upon a finding that a polluter would be unable to comply with
the national air quality standards because of the unavailability of necessary fuels. 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-10 (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857c (1970)). An addition
was also made to the section governing state implementation plans. This addition re-
quired the Administrator of the EPA to review each state plan to determine whether any
revision could be made to accommodate fuel burning polluters "without interfering with
the attainment and maintenance of any national ambient air quality standard.
42 U.S.C, § 1857c-5(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970)).
'0 A. discussion of Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), appears at notes 236-41
infra and accompanying text. The decision of Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), reconciled a split among the circuits with regard to a state's
authority to grant a "variance" for an individual polluter from the state's general com-
pliance shcedule. The Act states that the EPA must approve any revision of a state
implementation plan as long as national standards and deadlines are not threatened by
such approval. Section 110(a)(3)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)(A) (1970). Respondents
were successful in the Fifth Circuit in contending that the state must proceed under a
very rigid provision of the Act, which provides for a one-year postponement, rather than
under the revision section. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit decision
was reversed, based upon the Court's finding that the postponement provision did not
constitute the sole mechanism for exceptions to a state plan once the plan had been
approved. In so doing, the Court accepted the Environmental Protection Agency's in-
terpretation of the pertinent provision. In approving variances in the future, the Agency
is required to determine that the air in the relevant area meets the national standard
and that the proposed variance will not endanger continued maintenance of the air
quality at that nationally set level. Mr. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the
majority of seven. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented without opinion and Mr. Justice
Powell took no part in the decision. For discussions of this case, see Hardy, Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council: The Genesis of a New Era of Federal-State Rela-
tionships in Air Pollution Control, 24 Ctuv. ST. L. REV. 397 (1975); Hoffman& Swartz,
Environmental Law, 1974-75 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AM. LAW 641 (1975).
The most recent decision in this area, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976),
will be more extensively treated. See notes 179-87 infra and accompanying text. During
the 1976-77 term some interesting questions relating to federal-state relations will be
considered. See notes 103-30 infra and accompanying text.
" The House and Senate are currently considering amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The Senate Public Works Committee, Subcommittee on Environmental Pollution and
the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee submitted proposals to their
respective bodies for consideration. A Conference version will be considered by the
95th Congress. See discussion infra at notes 227-80 and accompanying text.
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ined. In particular, the central role which the sulfur dioxide standards
have played will serve to illustrate some of the areas in which the Clean
Air Act has encountered difficulties. "Sulfur dioxide is the primary pol-
lutant emitted by the burning of coal, and the nation's increased depen-
dence on coal has created a serious test of Congress' technology-forc-
ing policy embodied in the 1970 Amendments. 12  This is so because
the control of this particular pollutant has demanded technological inno-
vation and costly improvements to new and existing plants. As a re-
sult, industry and particularly the electric utilities, have made a concerted
effort to delay implementation and undermine the deadlines established
by Congress. The latter portion of this Note will consider their success
rate in view of the proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act to be
voted upon by the 95th Congress.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LEGISLATION
This Note will be concerned with stationary source compliance under
the Clean Air Act. 13  The Act required the Administrator of the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA) to compile a list of pollutants
"which in his judgment [have] an adverse effect on public health and
welfare."' 4  Two of the six pollutants originally listed by the Adminis-
trator, sulfur dioxide and particulate matter, are primarily emitted by
stationary sources whereas the other four pollutants are emitted by mobile
sources. The Clean Air Act requires two National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS) i5 to be set for each pollutant. The first standard
is aimed at the protection of the public health. Since Congress de-
termined that this standard was of primary importance, a specific dead-
line was set for its attainment. The more stringent secondary standard
was not believed to be of such immediate necessity. The secondary stan-
dard provides for a level of air quality which will protect the public
welfare by further reducing levels of pollution in order to eliminate
damaging effects on soil, vegetation, physical structures, and visibility.'6
12 See notes 142-50 infra and accompanying text.
1" Title I of the Act is designed to control air pollution which is emitted from sta-
tionary sources. Stationary sources are defined to include "any building, structure,
facility or installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6
(1970). In other words, Title I is intended to control primarily industrial polluters. Title
II controls emissions from mobile sources such as motor vehicles.
11 Section 108(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §' 1857c-3(a)(1)(A) (1970). To date six pollutants
are regulated and others are being studied. The six pollutants presently controlled are:
sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides, photochemical oxidants, particulates,
and hydrocarbons. The Second Circuit recently affirmed a New York district court's de-
cision instructing the agency to add lead to its list. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976). The Sierra Club has filed suit to require that
sulfates be added to the list. See note 28 infra.
15 Section 109, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). The Supreme Court has defined the
ambient air as "the outdoor air used by the general public." Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 65 (1975).
"6 Section 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970). The Act defines effects on the
public welfare as including: "[E]ffects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade ma-
terials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of
property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on economic values and on
personal comfort and well being." Section 302, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h (1970).
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The secondary standard was to be attained within a reasonable time after
attainment of the primary standard.
Stringent timetables are set up throughout the Act. For example, the
Administrator had thirty days after the enactment of the statute to pub-
lish a list of pollutants1 7 and four months to publish the primary and
secondary NAAQS.18 Within nine months after the federal standards
were promulgated, each state was required to submit a State Implemen-
tation Plan (SIP) to the agency. 9 The Administrator then had four
months to approve or disapprove each state plan according to eight
criteria set forth in the Act.20  If the plan met each of these criteria,
the Administrator was required to approve it.2' If a state's plan was
found to be in some respect deficient, the Administrator had two more
months in which to promulgate regulations for that state. 22  The most
important of these eight criteria directed that the plan provide for: "the
attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously as practicable but
...in no case later than three years from the date of approval of such
plan . . ..23 Pursuant to these timetables, the plans were to be ap-
proved by mid-1972 and the primary standard was to be implemented
by mid-1975.
In formulating their SIPs, the states were given full responsibility
for determining the "mix of emission limitations"2 4 necessary to attain
the national standards. Congress felt that decisions concerning the
'" Section 108(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3(a)(1) (1970).
18 Section 109(a)(1)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(a)(1)(A), (B) (1970). The national
standards were published in April, 1971 at 40 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1971).
19 Section 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970). The State Implementation
Plans were due, therefore, on January 31, 1972.
20 Section 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970). That section provides in part:
(2) The Administrator shall, within four months after the date required for
submission of a plan under paragraph (1), approve or disapprove such plan or
each portion thereof. The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion
thereof, if he determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing
and that -
(A)(i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air quality
standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as expeditiously
as practicable but (subject to subsection (e) of this section) in no case later tha
three years from the date of approval of such plan . . . ; and (ii) in the case of a
plan implementing a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies
a reasonable time at which such secondary standard will be attained.
(Emphasis added.) While these deadlines are at the core of the SIP, the statute specifies
seven other criteria which the Administrator must consider. The plan must include: (1)
emission limitations - timetables for compliance; (2) monitoring devices for analysis of
air quality; (3) a procedure for reviewing the location of new sources; (4) adequate pro-
visions for intergovernmental cooperation; (5) necessary assurances from the state that
it will have adequate personnel, funding, and authority with which to implement the SIP;
(6) procedures for periodic inspection of motor vehicles; and (7) provisions for revision
of the SIP in certain circumstances.
21 Upon approval, the state plan becomes enforceable as both a federal and a state law.
See note 75 infra.
22 Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970). Federal promulgation will be
discussed infra at note 57.
23 Section 110(a)(2)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i) (1970) (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, in a number of areas the primary standard has not yet been attained, and
deadlines have been extended to 1977.
24 Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
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amount of emissions from each local source were best handled at the local
level where all the industry-specific technological and economic ramifi-
cations could be considered. With first-hand knowledge of the special
problems created, the states could, perhaps, shift more of the burden
to those industries which could more efficiently reduce their emissions.
Congress' only concern was that the standard necessary to protect the
public health be met; how this was accomplished was of little impor-
tance to Congress, but of great economic significance to the states.
The tendency of the states in the past had been to weigh the public
health and welfare against the revenues being produced by industry and
to devise a cost-benefit analysis which reflected a lower monetary value
for intangibles such as the public health and welfare. Without national
standards, this weighing process was inevitable, particularly in industrial
states, because of the fear that the huge expenditures of capital neces-
sary for adequate pollution control might drive industry to a less restric-
tive state. The question arises whether the national standards set by
the EPA pursuant to the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 have, by
neutralizing any competitive advantage among the states, alleviated the
hesitancy of industrial states to regulate industry. Unfortunately, the
problem that existed with pre-1970 legislation has recurred in the con-
text of enforcement; states, though charged with enforcement of the Act,
are all too often sympathetic to those they are supposed to regulate. In
theory, Congress maintained that "existing sources of pollutants either
should meet the standard of the law or be closed down."2 5  In practice,
the states have been unwilling to take such drastic measures in enforcing
their SIPs. The states are understandably hesitant to cut the economic
lifelines that employ large numbers of their citizens and provide neces-
sary services to the state.
The alternative of federal enforcement, however, if carried to ex-
tremes, would cripple air pollution control. It was not Congress' intent
that enforcement rest with the federal EPA; 26 the federal agency simply
does not have adequate resources to take over if a number of states de-
fault on their responsibilities. Yet, when a state either refuses to pro-
mulgate an implementation plan or refuses to enforce an existing plan,
the only remedy provided by the Act is federal assumption of the re-
sponsibility.27 An examination of the implementation and enforcement
problems encountered in the northern industrial state of Ohio will
demonstrate the conflicts which emerge when a state permits industry to
dictate the extent of its own regulation.
25 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
26 See, e.g., section 101(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(a)(3) (1970), quoted at note 8 supra.
Another statutory indication that Congress intended for the states to assume full re-
sponsibility for enforcement is implicit in the requirement that the implementation plan
contain "assurances that the State will have adequate personnel, funding and authority
to carry out such implementation plan .... Section 110(a)(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-
5(a)(2)(F) (1970).
27 It has been suggested that Congress lacked the legal authority to force the states to
undertake enforcement. Comment, State Implementation Plans and Air Quality En-
forcement, 4 EcoLocv L.Q. 595, 631, 634 (1975). See discussion at notes 98-130 infra
and accompanying text.
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II. ONE STATE'S RESPONSE - FEDERAL INTERVENTION
The disruption of air pollution control in Ohio has revolved around
the sulfur dioxide regulations. Sulfur dioxide, considered hazardous to
the public's health and welfare, is one of the six pollutants currently
regulated by the EPA. Increased incidences of bronchitis, diseases of
the lower respiratory tract (particularly in young children), increased
asthma attacks, and aggravation of symptoms in cardiopulmonary
patients have all been attributed to high sulfur dioxide levels in the air. 28
Sulfur dioxide particles combined with atmospheric moisture produce a
sulfuric acid mist or rain which damages crops and vegetation as well as
buildings and other man-made materials. In addition, sulfur dioxide in
the atmosphere produces a brownish haze which decreases visibility.
According to the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC):
"Ohio emits more sulfur oxides than any other State - emissions that
affect the health of people hundreds of miles beyond Ohio's borders as
well as residents of this State. That alone is enough to make the Ohio
Plan significant nationally." 29 As recently as August 27, 1976, Ohio
had no plan for control of sulfur dioxide emissions 3° despite the fact
that in January 1972 a significant number of Ohio citizens converged
on the state capital to attend public hearings concerning Ohio's plan
for clean air.3' In that short-lived era of heightened public support for
a clean environment, Ohio submitted a plan even more stringent than
that proposed by the federal agency.32 Rather than require the attain-
ment of the primary standard within three years and the secondary
standard within a reasonable time thereafter, Ohio set the deadlines
28 U.S. EPA, HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SULFUR OXIDES: A REPORT FROM CHESS,
1970-71 at 7-4 to 7-23 (1974). The study suggests that suspended sulfates may be more
dangerous to the public health than either particulates or sulfur dioxide. Sulfates are
not emitted directly, but are secondarily formed in the atmosphere from other sulfur com-
pounds. Presently, there are no standards for sulfate regulation, but it is anticipated that
greater restrictions on the sulfur content of fossil fuels will be required once sulfur pollu-
tants have been adequately studied. One report has indicated that concentrations of sul-
fates at 10 micrograms per cubic meter may present a health hazard to certain population
groups. ENVIR. REP. (BNA), 7 Current Dev. 291-92 (June 18, 1976); compare this re-
port with the sulfur dioxide standard of 80 micrograms, note 33 infra. The Sierra Club
has recently filed suit to force the EPA to develop ambient air quality standards for sulfates.
Id. at 62 (May 21, 1976). See also Strelow, Reviewing the Clean Air Act, 4 EcoLocv
L.Q. 583, 587 (1975).
. 29 Statement of Richard E. Ayres on behalf of Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. on Proposed SO 2 [sulfur dioxide] Regulations for Ohio, January 13, 1976, at 1(submitted in writing at hearings conducted by the Federal EPA in Columbus, Ohio)
[hereinafter cited as Statement of Richard Ayres]. This fact was also asserted by the
New York Times. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1976, § 2 at 1, col. 1.
30 In August 1976, the federal EPA published final regulations for control of sulfur
dioxide emissions in Ohio. 41 Fed. Reg. 36,323 (Aug. 27, 1976). That plan is not yet
operative. See notes 62-64 infra and accompanying text.
31 "In 1971, in conformity with the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, the State formu-
lated a plan that would have markedly reduced air pollution from Ohio industry. Two
thousand Ohio citizens turned out to public hearings to support this strong action to re-
store Ohio's air to healthful quality." Statement of Richard Ayres, supra note 29, at 2.
32 Although Congress established a nationwide standard, the states retained the right
to set more stringent standards. See note 5 supra. For an in-depth discussion of section
116, 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970), which reserves this right to the states, see notes 68-75
infra and accompanying text.
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for the primary and secondary standards at the same time - three years
from the date of federal approval.33  Ohio's plan was submitted on
schedule to the Administrator of the EPA and, with a few exceptions,
was approved by the Administrator four months later, in accordance
with the schedule established by Congress. 34
Ohio industry, in particular the electric utilities, 35 immediately began
what has become a prolonged fight to weaken those standards. Their
gains have been substantial. First, the deadline for attainment of the
primary standard for five of the six pollutants has been extended from
mid-1975 to mid-1977.31 Secondly, with regard to the sixth, sulfur
dioxide, the standard has been reduced to the less stringent federal
primary standard with the deadline extended to 1979.37  Implementa-
tion of the secondary standards has likewise been deferred.
How did the electric utilities accomplish this? The onslaught be-
gan with a section 307 challenge 8 to the Administrator's approval of
Ohio's plan in 1972. The Clean Air Act provides that any interested
party can challenge the Administrator's actions under the judicial review
provision of the Act, section 307.
In Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,39 the petitioners, electric utilities
from Ohio and Kentucky, challenged the Administrator's approval of
33 For example, the federal primary standard for sulfur dioxide emissions was 80
micrograms per cubic meter as an annual arithmetic mean. The secondary NAAQS was
60 micrograms per cubic meter. Ohio's regulations provided for the adoption of this
60 micrograms standard as the only standard and required its attainment within three
years. OHIO EPA, HEARING EXAMINER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS iln re CON-
SOLIDATED ELEcrc UTILITY CASES, Case Nos. 73-A-P-120, et al., at 17-18 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as OHIO HEARING EXAMINER'S REPORT].
34 The Administrator's approval is published at 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842, 10,886 (1972).
35 The electric utilities and the steel mills are the largest sources of sulfur dioxide
emissions, a byproduct of burning fossil fuels such as coal. A recent EPA report noted
that several major source categories are not achieving compliance, including: coal-fired
power plants, iron and steel facilities and coking plants, and primary smelters. These
facilities account for one-third of all particulates and two-thirds of all sulfur dioxide emis-
sions. ENVIR. REP. (BNA), 7 Current Dev. 364 (June 25, 1976). Richard Ayres, attorney
for Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has indicated that, "[C]ontrolling emissions
from power plants, especially those burning coal, is the most important regulatory problem
faced by EPA." Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution Controls on Stationary Sources Under
the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 EcoLOGy L.Q. 441, 443 (1975).
36 Ohio EPA Regulations AP-3-04, AP-5-04, AP-7-03. ENVIR. REP. (BNA), 2 State
Air Laws 476:0541 -:0621 (1975).
37 The reduction in the standard was the result of federal intervention. The proposed
federal regulations set the standard at 80 micrograms per cubic meter as an annual
arithmetic mean. Final promulgation occurred in August, 1976, with compliance three
years from the date of promulgation. Of course, the 1979 deadline appears optimistic,
since a challenge has been filed in the Sixth Circuit. See notes 62-64 infra and ac-
companying text.
38 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970) reads in relevant part:
A petition for review of the Administrator's action in approving or promulgating
any implementation plan under section 1857c-5 of this title or section 1857c-6(d)
of this title may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the ap-
propriate circuit. Any such petition shall be filed within 30 days from the date
of such promulgation or approval, or after such date if such petition is based solely
on grounds arising after such 30th day.
For a general explanation of this provision, see text accompanying note 65 infra.
39 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
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those two state plans. The Sixth Circuit found that section 553 of the
Administrative Procedure Act 40 required the Federal Administrator to
conduct a hearing for interested parties before approving a state imple-
mentation plan, even though hearings had been held at the state level.
The decision in Buckeye Power had the effect of nullifying federal
approval of the two state plans. This decision has been strongly criti-
cized, 41 and it would now appear to be settled that such a duplication
at the federal level is neither envisioned by the Clean Air Act nor re-
quired by the Administrative Procedure Act. 42
In the meantime, the Ohio EPA, the state agency responsible for the
administration of Ohio's SIP, determined that its state plan had been
too demanding and sought a two-year delay from the federal agency.
When the request for a delay was denied, the Ohio EPA decided that
an alternative method had been presented by the decision in Buckeye
Power. The agency withdrew the ambitious plan, formulated under
heavy citizen pressure, and submitted a "new" plan with substantially
lower standards.4 The date for attainment of this new plan would be
40 Id. at 170-71. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970) provides:
After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an
opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data,
views or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. . . .When
rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
41 For sources of such criticism see note 168 infra.
42 Section 110(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(1) (1970), dictates that each state give
reasonable notice and provide a hearing for interested parties before adopting and sub-
mitting the state plan to the Administrator. Section 110(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2),
requires the Administrator to make a finding that the plan was adopted after reasonable
notice and a hearing. If the state fails to submit a plan or if no public hearing has been
held, section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c), requires the Administrator to provide hear-
ings for interested parties in that state.
Because the language of the Act clearly specifies the balance between federal and
state authority in this area, the only problems which may arise would appear to concern
the compatibility of the Clear Air Act provisions with those of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (A.P.A.), 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1970). Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477
F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973) held that Congress had, in effect, determined that federal hear-
ings would be unnecessary where adequate state hearings had been provided. Ac-
cording to the Fourth Circuit, this finding satisfied the requirements of section 553(b)(3)(B)
of the A.P.A. Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) was in accord, but
found that under the circumstances of that case a truly meaningful hearing had not been
provided to the petitioners at the state level. Id. at 8-9. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v.
EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975), following Appalachian Power, concluded that the
Fourth Circuit's interpretation comports with due process. Id. at 847. The court in
Buckeye Power implicitly found that any hearings at the state level would be inadequate
to protect petitioner's interests against possible federal enforcement. See note 196 infra.
The conclusion that only a state hearing is required finds support in Currie, Federal Air-
Quality Standards and Their Implementation, 1976 A.B.F. REs. J. 365, 370-71.
4 As a result of a subsequent challenge to portions of a new Ohio plan before the Ohio
Environmental Board of Review, an independent body which hears appeals regarding any
action of the Ohio EPA Director, certain 1973-74 interoffice memoranda were made part
of the public record. These documents reveal the development of a strategy between the
state government and the Ohio EPA, which culminated in a letter to the Chief of Staff
from the Director of the Ohio EPA. This letter was dated August 9, 1973, approximately
1% months after Buckeye Power was decided. Noting that a requested two-year delay
had been denied by the federal agency, the letter stated:
It is our intention now to seek a two-year delay by other means. The most promis-
ing possibility appears to lie in the recent Federal court decision in Buckeye
[Vol. 25:371
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set for three years from the date of federal approval. This enabled
the utilities and the Ohio EPA to, in essence, obtain a two year delay,"
and a considerable relaxation of the requirements for pollution control.
The legality of this strategy was questionable. Congress had pro-
vided several specific ways in which a delay could be obtained. For
example, under section 110(e)(1), upon application of the Governor, a
state could obtain a two-year extension at the outset.4 5 A number of
states did request and were granted this two-year extension. Secondly,
the Act provided for source-specific "postponements" for a one-year
period, again, upon application of the Governor. 46  Thirdly, the state
could have revised its plan as long as it continued to meet the require-
ments met at the time of its initial approval.4 7 Although the submission
of an entirely new plan was not provided for in the Act, it was argued
that a "revision" of Ohio's plan could not be made; revisions apply only
to approved plans, and the Administrator's approval of the Ohio plan
had been declared null and void by the Sixth Circuit.4
When the Buckeye Power case was decided in June 1973, Ohio had
already commenced work on a plan to "subregionalize" the state's Air
Quality Control Regions for the control of sulfur dioxides.49  It was,
therefore, decided that the Governor would write a letter to the federal
EPA withdrawing the sulfur dioxide portion of Ohio's new plan. The
other portions of the plan were proposed by the state in November
1973,50 and approved with some exceptions in April 1974. 5' Thus,
compliance with those portions of the plan would be required in April
1977, three years from the date of federal approval.5 2
Power et al. v. EPA .... At present, there is no legally approved Implementation
Plan for the State. It is our intention to submit the Plan again, with some neces-
sary changes which we are presently working on, as though it were an entirely
new submittal .... Since federal regulations permit attainment dates to be set
at three years from the date of approval of the Implementation Plan (which we
anticipate to come in January, 1974), the new date for attainment of the standards
would then be set at January, 1977.
Environmental Board of Review, EBR Case Nos. 74-6 through 74-10, Appendix A at
File VI, Packet D (1974).
44 Id. They estimated that the new attainment date would be 1977 rather than 1975.
, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e)(1) (1970).
40 Section 110(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f)(1) (1970).
17 Section 110(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3) (1970). See discussion of Train v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), supra note 10, for the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of this provision.
41 The proper course would probably have been to require the Administrator to repub-
lish the same plan, but to allow a period of time for public comment before reapproval.
The Sixth Circuit opinion supports this solution: "The approval of the Ohio and Kentucky
plans by the Administrator pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1973 Supp.) must
therefore be deferred until such time as the Administrator complies with Section 553 of
the APA." Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 171 (6th Cir. 1973).
41 This subregionalization plan was, apparently, first proposed in July 1972, and was
well underway by August, 1973, when the Governor withdrew the sulfur dioxide portion of
the plan. See Environmental Board of Review, EBR Case Nos. 74-6 through 74-10,
Appendix A (1974).
50 38 Fed. Reg. 31,543 (1973).
5, 39 Fed. Reg. 13,539 (1975). The Administrator specifically rejected the sulfur dioxide
provision since none was included in the approved state plan.
52 See note 36 supra.
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It was believed that Ohio would be able to submit its subregionaliza-
tion plan for sulfur dioxides before the federal Administrator was re-
quired to promulgate one for the state under section ll0(c). 53  The
plan for sulfur dioxides was indeed submitted in May 1974, but was
overturned in September by the Ohio Board of Environmental Review.
The plan was found to have been adopted with grossly insufficient pub-
lic notice of the far-reaching impact of its revisions. In addition, spe-
cific portions of the regulations were found to be "unlawful and/or
unreasonable.- 54  It was found that the subregionalization plan had
further divided the Air Quality Control Regions established by the fed-
eral government along county lines without regard for the factors nor-
mally considered when instituting control regions. 55 This was construed
as an attempt to modify Ohio's Air Quality Control Regions to accom-
modate industry, an alteration which defeated the purpose of those re-
gions.56
It, therefore, became incumbent upon the federal agency to promul-
gate a sulfur dioxide plan for the state.5 This should have been ac-
complished within six months after Ohio submitted the remainder of its
plan in November 1973. In March 1975, when no plan had yet been
proposed, the Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., an active litiga-
"I Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970), provides that if a state fails to sub-
mit a plan, or portion thereof, the Administrator shall prepare and publish proposed regu-
lations within six months after the required date for submission of the plan. In an inter-
office communication, dated August 22, 1973, between the Director of Ohio EPA and the
Governor of Ohio, the Director stated:
U.S. EPA will be forced to disapprove that portion of our plan and begin promul-
gation of its own sulfur oxides control strategy for Ohio. It is our expectation
that by the time they develop such a strategy Ohio EPA will have completed its
present work to develop a revised strategy. Then the Ohio strategy could be
promulgated by U.S. EPA in the Federal Register at the same time that Ohio
EPA is holding hearings on that strategy in the state.
Environmental Board of Review, EBR Case Nos. 74-6 through 74-10, Appendix A, File V,
Packet 1 (1974).
5 Environmental Board of Review, EBR Case Nos. 74-6 through 74-10 at 120 (1974).
55 The Environmental Board of Review exhaustively discussed the legislative history
of the Act as it relates to the concept of Air Quality Control Regions. Id. at 123-31.
Generally, the Board found that the Air Quality Control Regions were to include all com-
munities which share common air pollution problems based on meteorological, topographi-
cal, and urban-industrial factors.
56 Id. at 179, Findings of Fact:
(19) The certified record viewed as a whole, contains substantial reliable and
probative evidence to support the statement of the counsel for the Director that
the main motivation for much of the material developed in this record was to seek
an accommodation with the electric utility companies and other large industrial
sources;
(2) The sub-regionalization program, being based essentially on the motiva-
tion to accommodate the large sources, amounts to an alteration of the lawfully
designated air quality control regions which is not consistent with the character-
ization of the air quality control regions found in the 1970 Amendments of the
Federal Clean Air Act and its associated legislative history.
5" Section 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970) provides that the Administrator
shall prepare and publish proposed regulations for a state if: (1) the state fails to submit
a plan; (2) the plan or portion thereof submitted is disapproved; or (3) if the state fails to
revise the plan when required. If the state held no hearings then the Administrator
must conduct hearings in that state. The Administrator must act within six months
from the required date for submission of the plan or portion thereof by the state.
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tor in the area of environmental affairs, informed the Administrator
of its intention to bring suit under section 304 of the Clean Air Act.
58
The response, by letter, followed several months later, and suggested
that promulgation was anticipated before the end of that year. 59 In
October 1975, the Northern Ohio Lung Association, a local chapter of
the American Lung Association, filed suit in federal court pursuant to
section 304, the citizen enforcement section, seeking to enforce the man-
datory duty of the Federal Administrator under section 110(c). The
question was mooted when the proposed regulations were published on
November 10, 1975.60 Public hearings on the proposals were held at
four locations throughout the state in January 1976, and the revised reg-
ulations were issued in August 1976,61 a full two years after the ap-
proval of the other portions of Ohio's plan in 1974. Assuming that every-
thing proceeded smoothly after promulgation, final compliance with the
sulfur dioxide portion of the state's plan would occur three years from
that date, in 1979.
A rough road, however, is expected.62  The federal regulation as
finally promulgated is again subject to a section 307 challenge for judi-
cial review of the Administrator's action by any interested party.
Petitions have been filed by most of the state's electric utilities and the
steel industry; challenges have also been instituted by two Ohio-based
environmental groups.63 A stay of enforcement has been granted by
the Sixth Circuit.6 4
III. POSSIBLE CHALLENGES TO THE FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Section 307(b)(1) provides for judicial review of certain actions of
the Administrator including promulgation of any national air quality
ss Letter from Richard E. Ayres, Attorney for Natural Resources Defense Council, to
Russell E. Train, Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (March 24, 1975).
Section 304(a)( 2 ), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(a)(2) (1970) is the Citizen Suit provision of the
Clean Air Act and provides that any person may commence a suit: "(2) against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or
duty under this Act which is not discretionary with the Administrator." (Emphasis added.)
The Administrator's duty under section 110(c) is not discretionary since that language pro-
vides that the Administrator "shall" promulgate the regulations for the state.
5' Letter from Valdas V. Adamkus, Acting Regional Administrator, to Richard E. Ayres
and Cullen Phillips of the Natural Resources Defense Council (September 2, 1975).
60 40 Fed. Reg. 52,410 (1975).
61 41 Fed. Reg. 36,323 (1976).
62 In an interview with the new regional head of the federal EPA for Region V, of
which Ohio is a part, the new regional administrator stated: "We know we will be sued
on it [the Federal Regulations] regardless of what kind of plan we come out with. We
will have one that is defendable in court." Cleveland Press, May 3, 1976, at 12, col. 1.
6 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 76-2090, 76-2211, 76-2217, 76-2222, 76-2223,
76-2224, 76-2225, 76-2227, 76-2228, 76-2229, 76-2230, 76-2231, 76-2232, 76-2236,
76-2237, 76-2238, 76-2239, 76-2240, 76-2241, 76-2242, 76-2243, 76-2244, 76-2247,
76-2249, 76-2251, 76-2258, 76-2275, 76-2276, 76-2278, 76-2280, 76-2281, 76-2282,
76-2288, 76-2289, 76-2290, 76-2291 (6th Cir., filed August 23, 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 76-2090 et al.].
64 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, Nos. 76-2090 et al. (6th Cir. Nov. 12, 1976) (order
granting a stay of enforcement in order to permit "[clomments relating to clerical or
computational errors" and appropriate amendments by the respondents, EPA. Petition-
ers are prohibited from submitting new emissions, process, or air quality data).
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standard, approval of a state plan, or promulgation of a plan for a state
pursuant to section 110(c). The petition for review must be filed in
the appropriate federal court of appeals within 30 days of the Adminis-
trator's action. Appeals brought after that 30-day period are permitted
only if new grounds for review arise after that time. Section 307(b)(2)
forecloses review during enforcement proceedings of any matter that
should have been raised in a section 307(b)(1) petition.
No indication of the scope of review under section 307(b)(1) is given
in the language of the statute or in its legislative history. It has been
generally accepted that the Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe 65 limits the scope to a determination
of whether the Administrator's action was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. A number of issues which have been raised in
other section 307 challenges and which are likely to be raised as chal-
lenges to the federal sulfur dioxide regulations promulgated for Ohio
are discussed below.
A. Regulations More Stringent Than Necessary
The recently promulgated federal regulations for control of sulfur
dioxide emissions in Ohio are designed to bring the state's air quality
within the national primary ambient air quality standard. Ohio had
originally expressed a desire to achieve the more stringent secondary
standard within the three-year deadline. 66 However, the federal EPA
contended that it had authority only to promulgate a plan which would
meet the minimum requirements of section 110(a)(2). In other words,
the plan as promulgated by the federal agency does not provide for
reductions in emissions beyond those necessary to attain the primary
standard within three years. The more stringent state standard has
therefore been discarded. Most interested parties agree that this ap-
proach represents a reasonable interpretation of the role of the federal
agency.6 7
As will be seen, challenges to state plans on the grounds that they
are more demanding than necessary to meet the national standards are
clearly foreclosed; however, challenges to federal regulations on this same
ground are likely to succeed. Though a state is entitled to set more
stringent standards than are necessary to achieve and maintain the level
of air quality required by the federal government, this is strictly a policy
decision reached by each state's legislature. Congress, by virtue of sec-
65 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
66 See text at note 33 supra.
6 For support of this position see Luneburg, Federal-State Interaction under the Cleent
Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 637, 659-60 (1973). Currie, supra
note 42 at 379, similarly commented: "There is only one reason for the administrator to
impose a federal implementation plan on the polluters-to assure compliance with the
air-quality standards; if he imposes . . . standards that are more stringent than necessary
to this end, he has exceeded his statutory authority." See aLso South Terminal Corp. v.
EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974), where the court ordered a new hearing to allow peti-
tioners to present their claims that the emission reductions proposed by EPA were not
necessary to meet national air quality standards.
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tion 116, plainly intended that the state should have the right to set such
rigorous standards,m a prerogative twice confirmed by the Supreme
Court.69 The Administrator is not permitted to disapprove a more
stringent state plan on the grounds that the plan is economically or
technologically infeasible, or because it is not necessary to attain the na-
tional standards, since either approach would supplant the state's right
to set a higher priority for the health of its citizens.7 ° In reviewing a
state's plan, the federal agency's duty is to determine that it will provide
at least the minimum level of air quality necessary to protect the public
health.
The Supreme Court has not fixed the scope of the federal agency's
authority when promulgating a plan for a state under section 110(c).
71
It can, however, be inferred from the decisions of the Court and from
the federal-state nature of the Act that the agency's authority does not
include adoption of more stringent standards than necessary to meet the
minimum requirements of section 110(a)(2). There is an even stronger
case for this construction of the Administrator's duty in Ohio, where the
state has already expressed an intention to retreat from its earlier, more
ambitious plan. The Supreme Court has held that a state may reconsider
and adopt less stringent standards as long as the national standard is
not threatened. 72
- 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970) provides that:
[N]othing in this Chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or politi-
cal subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respect-
ing emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting control or abate-
ment of air pollution; except that if an emission standard or limitation is in
effect . . . such State or political subdivision may not adopt or enforce any emis-
sion standard or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation
under such plan or section.
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended that the states should be able to set
more stringent standards than required to achieve the national air quality standards.
See note 5 supra. For an argument in favor of this interpretation of the statutory section,
see Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement Against
Stationary Sources, 89 JiARv. L. REV. 316, 321 (1975).
" In Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975), the Su-
preme Court held that the states could grant individual polluters variances so long as
the national standards were not thereby threatened, thus implying that the state's stan-
dards must have originally been more stringent than necessary. See note 10 supra. In
Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 . Ct. 2518 (1976), the Court expressly held that a state "may
adopt emission standards stricter than the national standards." It relied on section 116
of the Act to support this conclusion. Id. at 2528.
70 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 2528-29 (1976).
Id. at 2527 n.7.
72 See note 69 supra. Congress has also indicated that the states may reduce their
standards if such reduction does not interfere with attainment of the national standards.
The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974, see note 9 supra, which
amends section 110 of the Clean Air Act, states that the Administrator shall approve
any revision of a state plan if he finds that it satisfies the requirements of section l10(a)
(2). 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)(A) (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)
(1970)). It further provides that the Administrator shall review all of the state plans and
report to the state any possible revision which could lessen the burden on fuel burning
sources without interference with the national standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(3)(B)
(Supp. IV 1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970)). There is no requirement,
however, that the state submit such a revision. Thus, Congress promoted the state's
right to require a higher standard of air quality for its citizens.
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It is evident that industry challenges directed essentially at the
stringency of a state plan will gain little success in federal courts. 73
Industry's recourse will lie with the state.74  If the state is cooperative,
a variance or revision of the state plan may be obtained, and the EPA
will approve the change if the national standard is not thereby en-
dangered.7 5  Unlike plans adopted by the states, provisions enacted by
the federal agency pursuant to the mandatory duty of section 110(c)
may be challenged on grounds that they are more stringent than neces-
sary to meet the national primary standards since the federal govern-
ment does not have the same prerogative as the states under section 116.
The interested parties to the Ohio sulfur dioxide regulations have,
at least, impliedly agreed with this basic assumption. The disagreement
will more likely be centered on whether the federally imposed regula-
tions, which are based upon computer models, accurately predict the
minimum amount of emissions reductions required to meet the primary
standard.7 6 The utilities and the Ohio EPA contended that the proposed
regulations would result in "overkill ' 77 or reductions in emissions that
are "unreasonable or unnecessary" 78 to achieve the national standard.
By contrast, the Natural Resources Defense Council predicted that the
73 Amici in the Union Electric case argued that the Administrator could reject a plan
that was too strict. 96 S. Ct. at 2527.
71 Such a solution was suggested by the federal agency, Brief for Respondent at 10,
and adopted by the Union Electric Court, 96 S. Ct. at 2529-30, relying on Train v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975).
75 While the state is considering such alterations and has stayed enforcement against
the industries that will be affected, federal enforcement is, of course, a potential haz-
ard. This was the situation in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), and
in Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshatis, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1973), where petitioners had
filed for state variances. See discussion infra at notes 152-56 and accompanying text.
By contrast, some commentators have argued that the federal agency can only enforce
those emission limitations necessary to attainment of the national standards. See, e.g.,
Currie, supra note 42, at 399. However, this conclusion is not supported by the Supreme
Court's most recent decision, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976). In Union
Electric the Court rejected petitioner's argument that states wishing to elect more strin-
gent standards must do so independently of the plan adopted for federal approval. Id.
at 2528-29. The Court found that "two sets of emission standards, one federally ap-
proved plan and one stricter state plan" are not required by the Clean Air Act and would
impose a "wasteful burden" on the states and on the EPA. Absent two sets of emission
standards, federal enforcement at the minimal level required to meet the national stan-
dards would impose a tremendous burden upon the Administrator. The more appropriate
view appears to be that the agency has authority to enforce any provision of an appli-
cable state implementation plan, since such plans have the force and effect of federal
law.
70 Computer modeling is used to predict the amount of emission reductions in a given
area requisite for compliance with the national ambient air quality standards. For a criti-
cism of such techniques see Ayres, Enforcement of Air Pollution ControLs on Stationary
Sources Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 4 Ecoocy L.Q. 441, 469 (1975).
77 Testimony Presented by Ohio Environmental Protection Agency to United States En-
vironmental Protection Agency in a Public Hearing on the Proposed Sulfur Dioxide Con-
trol Strategy for the State of Ohio on January 13, 1976 at Section II. C. 3 [hereinafter
cited as Statement of Ohio EPA].
78 The Statement of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company for Presentation at
Public Hearings in Cleveland, Ohio on January 6, 1976 Relative to Proposed Federal EPA
Sulfur Dioxide Regulations for Ohio at 8-12. But cf. Bleicher, Economic and Technical
Feasibility in Clean Air Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HAnv. L. REV. 316,
326 (1975).
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minimum national primary standard would not be met under the pro-
posed federal regulations due to inadequate modeling techniques em-
ployed by the EPA. 7
9
In Texas v. EPA, 0 the Fifth Circuit was faced with a challenge to
the federal agency's use of modeling techniques which depend on pro-
jections and assumptions rather than actual data. The court took a
sensible view of the situation and determined that such methods were
necessary; that the modeling was essentially neutral in that the margin
for error cut both ways; and that the agency would remain under a
"continuing responsibility to develop, review and apply updated and
more sophisticated information.""' In South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
the First Circuit, though remanding to the EPA, stated that the revised
plan should contain provisions for adjustment in light of changing data.82
It should be noted, however, that other courts have been less willing to
accept the EPA's methodology.8 3
B. Continuous Emission Limitations
Another possible challenge to the federal regulations revolves around
the selection of continuous emission limitations over either intermittent
controls or dispersion enhancement techniques. Continuous emission
limitations reduce the actual volume of pollutants emitted into the air
at a constant rate. 4  Intermittent controls, a method advocated by
industry, reduce the amount of emissions at those times when the pollu-
tion levels become dangerously high. 5  Dispersion enhancement tech-
niques do nothing to reduce the amount of pollution entering the
atmosphere; rather they reduce the concentration in the immediate
vicinity of the plant by dispersing the pollutants over a wider area.88
Three circuits have considered the appropriateness of these three
methods and have consistently found continuous emission limitations
" Statement of Richard Ayres, supra note 29, at 8-9.
80 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub. nom. Exxon Corp. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct.
3191 (1976).
11 Id. at 301 n.16. This result has been cited with favor in Kennecott Copper Corp.
v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1152-53 n.16 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976).
82 504 F.2d 646, 666 (1st Cir. 1974).
13 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The
circuit court remanded to the agency for supplementation of its record in support of its
decision not to accord automobile manufacturers one-year extensions. The court held
that the Administrator bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness and reliability
of his methodology. Id. at 648.
84 Continuous emission limitations may be accomplished by one of two methods.
First, a device may be installed in the smokestacks to extract the pollutants before the
gases are emitted. For particulates the device is a precipitator; for sulfur dioxide, flue
gas desulfurization, or scrubbers, are used. Secondly, emissions may be reduced by modi-
fying the fuel; for example, the state may require that only low sulfur coal or oil be used.
85 This method would provide for switching to low sulfur fuel or reducing operations
during times of alert.
86 Dispersion is effectuated through a combination of tall smokestacks and a varying
of emissions dependent upon the strength of prevailing winds. In other words, tall smoke-
stacks decrease the ground level of pollution in the immediate vicinity of the plant by
dispersing the particles over a wider area. This method can be coupled with a type
of intermittent control when the winds slacken during an inversionary period.
19761
15Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1976
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
to be the preferred control method.8 7 Their conclusions have been based
upon a number of factors. First, the language of the statute supports
the position that measures other than emission limitations are to be used
only when "necessary to insure attainment and maintenance" of the
NAAQS. s8  Cases decided since Train v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.,89 have found further support in the Supreme Court's use
of the term "composition" of emissions, which implies control of the
amounts of pollutants as well as their concentration.90 The Energy
Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974,"' which amended
the Clean Air Act in response to the 1973 oil embargo and energy crisis,
and the proposed Conference Report definition of emission limitations,92
both reaffirm the use of continuous emission limitations. 93  Finally,
the use of dispersion enhancement techniques has been found to run
contrary to the nondegradation policy of the Clean Air Act.94 This
policy is generally understood to mean that, in areas where the air is
already cleaner than required by the NAAQS, the state should not allow
the air to significantly deteriorate.95
8 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 935 (1976); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 934 (1976); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390,
403-11 (5th Cir. 1974), rev'd in part on other issues sub. nom. Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
8s Section 110(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970), provides that for state
implementation plans to be approved by the Administrator, the plans must include "emis-
sion limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such limitations, and such
other measures as may be necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of such pri-
mary or secondary standard." See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 489
F.2d 390, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1974). For an argument that the definition of emission limi-
tations be broadened to encompass tall stacks, see Currie, supra note 42 at 375-77.
s- 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
90 The Sixth Circuit emphasized the significance of the Supreme Court's use of the
term "composition" in its definition of emission limitations. Because "composition" was
defined as relative to the "kind" and "amount" of substances emitted, the court con-
cluded that: "Under this definition a rule or regulation pertaining to sulfur dioxide or
any other contaminant, would qualify as an emission limitation only if it regulates the
amount of that kind of material which may be included in the emission from a given
source." Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 21-22 (6th Cir. 1975) (emphasis
in original). The Ninth Circuit supported the position taken by the Sixth Circuit in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 1975).
91 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-10 (Supp. IV 1974) (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 -1858a (1970)).
92 The definition provides that "It]he terms 'emission limitation' and 'emission
standard', and 'standard of performance' mean a requirement established by the State or
the Administrator which limits the quantity, rate, or concentration of emissions of air
pollutants on a continuous basis, including a detailed schedule and timetable of compli-
ance." CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 301 (1976) (amending § 302(i)(1), 42
U.S.C. § 1857(h) (1970)) (emphasis added). The Committee Notes indicate that this
provision is meant to clarify and reaffirm existing law. Id. at 113.
93 Congress unsuccessfully attempted to provide for intermittent control strategies as a
permanent method. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of these amend-
ments as they relate to intermittent controls, see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526
F.2d 1149, 1156-60 (9th Cir. 1975).
94 NRDC v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1974). This finding appears imo-
plicit in the Ninth Circuit's opinion, see Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1149,
1153 n.18 (9th Cir. 1975); Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16, 21 (6th Cir. 1975).
95 The Congress is presently considering definitions of a nonsignificant deterioration
policy. See discussion at notes 244-60 infra and accompanying text. Support for the
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The federal regulations for Ohio employ continuous emission limita-
tions. An industry challenge on this point appears highly unlikely since
the Sixth Circuit has already indicated that this is the preferred control
method.96 The interesting twist to this issue in Ohio is the allegation
by the Natural Resources Defense Council that the federal regulations
will have the effect of merely dispersing polluters more evenly through-
out the state, thus violating the nondegradation policy in those cleaner
areas of the state. NRDC's argument results from the federal agency's
decision to impose only emission limitations as stringent as necessary
to attain the primary national standard. This approach, NRDC contends,
will "maximize" emissions in all areas of the state up to the standard
and jeopardize the policy of nondegradation since new pollution sources
will move away from presently polluted areas into areas where the
concentrations are currently much lower than the national standard.
Thus, rather than actually reducing emissions, the projected result is
the dispersion of pollution more evenly throughout the state at a level
just below the national standard for clean air.9 7
C. Federal or State Enforcement
The Ohio EPA has indicated that it has "doubtful authority" to en-
force the federal sulfur dioxide regulations.9 8  Since the federal EPA's
primary concern is prompt compliance with the regulations, it is ex-
pected that the federal agency will expeditiously enforce its own "federal
compliance schedule."9 9  It is anticipated, however, that the state
agency will eventually hold public hearings to adopt the federal regula-
tions, or a modified, acceptable version of those regulations, as state
law thereby resuming state enforcement. The federal agency would
probably wish to avoid a legal battle with an uncertain outcome in order
to impose these enforcement duties upon an unwilling state. 100
The outcome of such a legal battle, if necessary, is an open question.
existence of such a policy may be found in: section 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857(b)(1)
(1970); the Supreme Court's decision of Fri. v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973); and
Note, Review of EPA's Significant Deterioration Regulations: An Example of the Diffi-
culties of the Agency-Court Partnership in Environmental Law, 61 VA. L. REv. 1115
(1975).
96 Big Rivers Elec. Corp. v. EPA, 523 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1975).
" Statement of Richard Ayres, supra note 29, at 5-6. This is a novel idea, as yet
untested in the courts. Moreover, it focuses on one of the potentially serious effects
of the establishment of national standards - the possibility that the standards will be-
come the norm, rather than the minimum level for clean air.
" Statement of Ohio EPA, supra note 77. The agency offers no explanation con-
cerning the reasons why they consider their authority to be "doubtful." The Act supports
the proposition that federal regulations adopted in accordance with section 110(c), 42
U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970), become integrated into the state implementation plan and there-
fore, are enforceable by the states.
" 40 Fed. Reg. 52,410 (1975).
100 The federal agency's expected reluctance to take action against Ohio for its failure
to enforce the federal regulations is attributable to two factors. First, Ohio has been lax
in the adoption of sulfur dioxide regulations, and there is no evidence that it would be any
less so in the enforcement. Secondly, at the public hearings held in January 1976, the
federal agency's primary concern appeared to be to avoid any further delay in enforce-
ment resulting from further litigation.
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While Congress expected that the states would assume primary re-
sponsibility for promulgation and enforcement,' they did not provide
any sanctions against a state that failed to assume the legislative and
administrative responsibilities delegated by the Act to the states. The
real issue is whether Congress could constitutionally compel the states
to perform what is essentially a governmental function. The Act itself
appears to contemplate voluntary compliance by the states. 0 2
The issue has arisen thus far in situations in which the Administrator
promulgated a transportation plan, or portion thereof, for a state that
had failed to. submit an appropriate plan. Included within the plans
which have been challenged was a regulation to the effect that the
state is required to enforce the plan. By including this atypical provi-
sion within the implementation plan, the EPA argues that a state which
fails to comply with this provision is subject to potential civil or criminal
penalties under section 113, the federal enforcement provision. There
have been four circuit court decisions on point; the Supreme Court has
granted review in the three most recent cases to determine the statutory
and constitutional authority for the EPA's unusual regulation. 0 3 While
all parties agree that federal regulation of pollution is within the com-
merce powers of Congress, 0 4 the EPA maintains that the additional
requirement, that states legislatively adopt the federal regulations and
assume enforcement responsibility or be held in violation of the plan
and subject to federal enforcement proceedings, is also within those
powers. The states, on the other hand, contend that legislative enact-
ments and their enforcement are governmental functions reserved to the
states via the tenth amendment and therefore not within the powers
granted to Congress by the commerce clause.
The first case to consider the issue was Pennsylvania v. EPA.'15
Pennsylvania submitted its transportation control plan which was ap-
proved in part and disapproved in part by the Administrator, who then
proposed further regulations pursuant to his mandatory duty under sec-
tion 110(c). The plan required Pennsylvania to promulgate analogous
state regulations; these regulations would institute a program to retrofit
pre-1968 vehicles with a special device to reduce hydrocarbon and
carbon monoxide emissions. The Administrator attempted to invoke the
101 See note 8 supra.
102 See note 130 infra and accompanying text. For an interpretation of the statute
that contemplates mandatory state compliance, see Salmon, The Federalist Principle:
The Interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean Air Act,
2 COLUM. J. ENVIR. L. 290 (1976).
103 The first case on point was Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
The three subsequent cases, in which the Supreme Court granted certiorari, were: Mary-
land v. EPA, 8 E.R.C. 1105 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976); District
of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976);
Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 426 U.S. 904 (1976). A New
York District Court has held that, pursuant to section 304, citizen enforcement is only
authorized in situations where the state is a polluter. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 422
F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
104 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown
v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 837 (9th Cir. 1975).
105 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974).
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federal enforcement procedures of section 113106 against the common-
wealth. In determining that the Administrator had such authority under
section 113, the court stated that the underlying issue was whether
Congress had the power to mandate state enforcement of either a federal
or state-adopted implementation plan.
1 0 7
Before reaching the constitutional question, the court concluded that
Congress did intend that states be subject to federal enforcement "in
at least some cases." This conclusion was based on two grounds: that
states are persons under the Act and that section 113 permits federal
enforcement action when a violation of "any requirement" of a state
plan has occurred.108 By including in the federally promulgated state
plan a provision which required state adoption and enforcement of the
transportation provisions, a state which failed to comply could be held
in violation of a requirement of its own plan.
This interpretation appears to be begging the question, since the real
issue was whether the Administrator had the statutory authority to in-
clude such a provision in the state plan. Section 113 on its face does
not appear to set forth a sanction against a state for failure to adopt or
enforce provisions of the plan.109 Even though the definitional section
of the Act defines "person" to include states, municipalities, and state
political subdivisions,'10 a careful reading of section 113 tends to support
a more narrow construction of the word - applied in accordance with
that section to include only polluters who are in violation of the plan.
Under this interpretation, a state may be held in violation if it is a pol-
luter, but may not be so held for a mere failure to perform some purely
governmental function. Two of the circuits have noted this alternative
statutory construction but have reached different conclusions regarding
when the state may be considered a polluter.
In Brown v. EPA the Ninth Circuit defined the state as a polluter
101 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-8 (1970) provides for two situations in which the Administrator
may invoke these procedures. First, where the Administrator finds that conduct is
violative of a state implementation plan, he shall so notify that violator and the state re-
sponsible for enforcement; thirty days thereafter, he may issue a compliance order or
institute civil action. Secondly, where the Administrator determines that violations of a
plan are "so widespread that they appear to result from a failure of the State in which the
plan applies to enforce the plan effectively," he must give notice of such violations to that
state. Thirty days after state notification, he must give public notice. Once public notice
has been given, the Administrator may enforce that state plan until the state indicates its
intention to resume enforcement. This procedure is referred to as the "period of federally
assumed enforcement."
Federal enforcement may involve either the issuance of a compliance order, after the
polluter has been given an opportunity to confer with the Administrator, or a civil action
for permanent or temporary injuctive relief. The compliance order should "specify a time
for compliance which the Administrator determines is reasonable, taking into account the
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply." In the alternative the
Administrator may seek injunctive relief in federal district court. In either case, the
penalties are not in excess of $25,000 per day of violation and/or one-year imprison-
ment.
107 500 F.2d at 256.
108 Id. at 256-57.
109 The section applies to "any person" who is in violation of "any requirement of an
applicable implementation plan" and requires notice to the state as well as to the violator.
110 Section 302(e), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970).
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when it owned or operated a direct source of pollution."' District of
Columbia v. Train suggested that there are both direct and indirect
sources of pollution and held that highways, for example, were "factors
which influence use of pollution sources by other parties." 2 The court
concluded that a provision to construct bus lanes and to purchase addi-
tional buses was appropriately enforceable against the states. The New
York District Court, while apparently adopting the idea of indirect
pollution sources, pointed out that the bus system was not a polluter
but, more precisely, constituted a "useful tool in discouraging auto-
mobile traffic."" 3 The New York court upheld provisions, however,
to eliminate on-street parking in New York City since its availability
was found to be an indirect source of pollution." 4 In Maryland v. EPA,
the Fourth Circuit appears to have adopted the Third Circuit view that
a state is a person under all sections of the Act," 5 but disagreed with
the Third Circuit result that section 113 permits federal enforcement
against a state for failure to adopt a federally proposed plan.
At the constitutional level the Third Circuit's interpretation in Penn-
sylvania v. EPA is even less tenable. The court's statement that Con-
gress may require states to exercise legislative and administrative powers
is unsupported by authority. 1 6  The Ninth," 7 District of Columbia,"'
and Fourth Circuits'1 9 have all concluded that such an interpretation
1 521 F.2d 827, 832 (9th'Cir. 1975).
112 521 F.2d 971, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The view that highways are indirect sources
of pollution is supported by the federal regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 52.22(b)(1)(i) (1975).
113 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 9 E.R.C. 1007, (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
14 Id. at 1014. In addition to on-street parking, the court cited issuance of permits for
new off-street parking and restraints on licensing of taxi cabs as possible indirect sources
of pollution, or "factors which influence the use of pollution sources by others." Id. at
1013-15.
11 8 E.R.C. 1105, 1112 (4th Cir. 1975).
116 500 F.2d at 262. The conclusion appears to be based on the Third Circuit's in-
terpretation of Maryland v. Wirtz, a case which has since been overruled. Id. at 261.
See notes 121-25 infra and accompanying text.
117 The Ninth Circuit contended that in neither Fri v. United States, 421 U.S. 542
(1975), nor Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), did the Court consider the precise
question at issue here because in those cases, the states were found to have engaged in
activity that substantially affected interstate commerce. The facts did not merit ex-
amination of the "state's exercise of its police power with respect to an economic ac-
tivity which affects interstate commerce." The Ninth Circuit thus emphasized the dis-
tinction between a state engaging in commerce and a state merely regulating the commerce
of its private citizens. 521 F.2d at 838 & n.45. The court stated that,
To treat the governance of commerce by the states as within the plenary reach of
the Commerce Power would in our opinion represent such an abrupt departure from
previous constitutional practice as to make us reluctant to adopt an interpretation
of the Clean Air Act which would force us to confront the issue.
Id. at 839.
Is In the District of Columbia Circuit's view, the requirement that the states, as
indirect sources of pollution, construct bus lanes and purchase more buses is analogous
to the regulation of state-owned railroads upheld in United States v. California, 297 U.S.
175 (1936), but the states may not be required to administer and enforce federal regula-
tions against individual automobile owners. Voluntary state cooperation or direct federal
regulation are the only statutory and constitutionally available alternatives. District of
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 989-93 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
"9 The Fourth Circuit concluded that: "[lI]f there is any attribute of sovereignty left
[V1ol. 25:371
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would render the Act unconstitutional as outside the commerce clause;
therefore, those courts failed to find clear congressional intent for such
a questionable statutory construction.1
20
The Supreme Court has recently overruled the case of Maryland v.
Wirtz' 21 upon which the Third Circuit relied for its broad interpretation
of the commerce clause. The Supreme Court decision, National League
of Cities v. Usery,122 suggests that federal regulations which "impermis-
sibly interfere with the integral [state] governmental functions" should
be construed as outside congressional commerce powers. 23 In in-
terpreting the statute upheld in Maryland v. Wirtz, the National League
of Cities Court ruled that the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, 24 which extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements to almost all state employees, was an unconstitutional in-
fringement on state policymaking in the area of "administering the pub-
lic law and furnishing public services."'125 In National League of Cities
the state was an employer with the requisite effect upon commerce. 2 6
Therefore, the Supreme Court's analysis would appear to be a highly re-
strictive definition of the commerce powers, since that Court failed to
distinguish between a state engaged in economic activity affecting com-
merce, a category including a state polluter, and state regulation of the
economic activity of others. The concurring opinion suggested that a
balancing test would be employed when Congress attempts to regulate
state-related commerce and noted that the decision "does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the fed-
to the states it is the right of their legislatures to pass, or not to pass, laws." 8 E.R.C.
at 1112.
120 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Brown
v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834-36, 839 (9th Cir. 1975). The Southern District of New York has
followed suit. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
121 392 U.S. 183 (1968). This case upheld the 1966 amendments to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970), which removed the exemption for state em-
ployees in hospitals, institutions, and schools.
122 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
123 Id. at 2473. In striking down the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards
Act the Court held "that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly dis-
place the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional govern-
mental functions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."
Id. at 2474.
Friends of the Earth is the first case to reach the question of the constitutional breadth
of the commerce power since the decision in National League of Cities. In the district
court's view, the National League of Cities decision strengthened the argument that an
interpretation of section 113 or 304 of the Clean Air Act, which imposed upon the states
the requirement of enforcing federally-promulgated regulations, would contravene the
tenth amendment and recommended that such an interpretation should be avoided when
another is possible. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 422 F. Supp. 638, 643-44 n.ll (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
124 29 U.S.C. § 293(d) (Supp. IV 1974) redefines employer to include any public
agency. Public agency was also redefined to include any state or political subdivision
thereof. Id. § 203(x).
125 96 S. Ct. at 2474.
2' The New York case did not address this question of the breadth of the National
League of Cities decision directly. Nevertheless, by implication, the court has failed to
accept this broader interpretation, since it remains willing to allow enforcement actions to
be instituted against the state as a polluter.
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eral interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance
with imposed federal standards would be essential."1 2
7
Literal statutory construction as well as present interpretation of the
commerce clause indicate that Congress did not intend the federal gov-
ernment to institute civil or criminal enforcement proceedings against
a state, except perhaps when the state is a polluter. Thus, it would
appear that voluntary state cooperation is contemplated. The proposed
conference bill permits a state governor to apply for a five-year exten-
sion of the deadline for attainment of primary standards in Air Quality
Regions that will require transportation controls to meet those stan-
dards. 28  In the event a state fails to apply for an extension or the
Administrator denies the extension request, the Administrator must
propose and promulgate a plan that complies with the federal require-
ments. The conference bill further provides that the Administrator "may
delegate the implementation or enforcement" of that plan to the state or
local government. 129 To interpret this provision consistently with the
theory of voluntary state cooperation would mean that the Administrator
could only delegate the responsibility to a state which had demonstrated
a willingness to assume the task.
It is unlikely that the interpretation of the Clean Air Act suggested
by the Ninth, District of Columbia, and Fourth Circuits will result in
widespread withdrawal of state involvement in air pollution control.
As noted by the court in Maryland v. EPA, many forms of pressure have
been upheld, including the withholding of federal funds, in order to
induce the states to "voluntarily" comply with other federal legislation.
Furthermore, the threat of rigorous federal enforcement may constitute
a sufficient motive for the state to resume primary responsibility for
pollution control. In effect, the state would probably prefer the expense
of state enforcement to the doggedness of federal enforcement.
30
D. Claims of Economic and Technological Infeasibility
The new sulfur dioxide regulations for Ohio were published in the
Federal Register in August 1976.131 Numerous petitions for judicial
review of the Administrator's action have been filed in the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals under section 307(b)(1).13 2 Until recently, a conflict
existed among the various circuits regarding the relevant factors which
could be considered in the review of agency action. In Union Electric
Co. v. EPA,133 the Supreme Court resolved one important aspect of this
conflict. The Court ruled that the reviewing court may not consider
127 96 S. Ct. at 2476 (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun's reference to environ-
mental protection may have been based on consideration of the circuit court cases dis-
cussed herein. Even so, his exception would appear to apply to the state as a polluter, not
to the state as enforcer of the federal regulations.
128 Conf. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 124 (1976) (adding § 125).
129 Id. § 124 (proposed § 125(g)(2)).
130 8 E.R.C. at 1114.
131 41 Fed. Reg. 36,323 (1976).
132 See note 63 supra.
133 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
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industry claims that compliance with the state implementation plan is
either economically or technologically impracticable. Prior to the Su-
preme Court's decision, the electric utilities had experienced varying
degrees of success in asserting "impracticability claims" against com-
pliance with state sulfur dioxide standards. Whether the outcome of
Union Electric will preclude the assertion of such claims by challengers
to the federal sulfur dioxide regulations in Ohio, however, remains un-
certain.
1. Compliance with Sulfur Dioxide Standards
In recent years the sulfur dioxide standards have been subject to
frequent attack. It is now questionable whether the real health hazard
results from the presence of sulfur dioxide or from suspended sulfates
in the atmosphere. 134 While the same sources are involved in either
case, the reduction of suspended sulfate levels may necessitate tighter
controls than those currently employed in sulfur dioxide regulation.
There are essentially three ways in which sulfur dioxide emissions
can be controlled in order to meet present standards: (1) through the
use of low sulfur fuels, particularly coal, found mainly in the western
states and largely unavailable east of the Mississippi River; (2) coal
washing and blending of high and low sulfur coals; and (3) flue gas
desulfurization systems ("scrubbers"), which the EPA has found to be
an available and reliable control method, but to which the electric utili-
ties object on the grounds that the devices are costly and not yet tech-
nologically foolproof.
EPA has estimated that about thirty percent of the nation's coal-
fired power plants will require scrubber installations by 1980.135 More-
over, the EPA contends that the utilities have expended greater efforts
in fighting the use of scrubbers than in seeking solutions to the problems
which they allege to be inherent in these systems. 136 Both sides would
agree that a major obstacle is cost. Although the EPA estimates an
average nationwide consumer cost increase for electricity of approxi-
mately three percent, 37 those consumers within the service area of a
utility company required to install scrubbers on a number of its boilers
can expect an increase significantly above the national average.138
The utilities have argued that it would be extremely difficult to pass
these costs on to the consumer due to the slow process of receiving
approval for rate increases from state utility commissions. 39 Further
problems arise in obtaining the initial financing for such large capital
134 See note 28 supra.
135 REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL, U.S. EPA, National Public Hearings on Power Plant
Compliance with Sulfur Oxide Air Pollution Regulations 2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
ARLINGTON HEARINGS REPORT].
130 Id. at 4.
137 Id. at 7.
138 See, e.g., Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186, 1190 (3d Cir. 1975) (ex-
pected increase to the consumer was estimated to be as high as 35 percent).
139 Id. at 1195.
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expenditures. There is also strong disagreement as to the technological
feasibility of scrubbers. In its Arlington Hearings in January 1974,
the EPA concluded that the reliability of scrubbers was sufficiently dem-
onstrated to warrant widespread industry commitment; 40 In September
of that same year, an Ohio Hearing Panel in an adjudicatory proceeding
reached the opposite conclusion.' 41
2. The Act and Its Legislative History
Whether a reviewing court can consider impracticability claims when
reviewing action by the Administrator depends upon whether the Ad-
ministrator himself could evaluate such claims when he approved or
disapproved the state plan, or when he promulgated portions of a plan
for a state. 42  In according great deference to the agency interpretation
and in reviewing the Act's legislative history, the Supreme Court, in
Union Electric, concluded that impracticability claims are "wholly for-
eign to the Administrator's consideration of a state implementation
plan. ' 43 In particular, the Court found that the primary standards
were intended by Congress to be of a "technology-forcing" nature, and,
as such, "are expressly designed to force regulated sources to develop
pollution control devices that might at the time appear to be economi-
cally or technologically infeasible."' 44
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act unequivocally supports
the view that claims of economic and technological hardship are irrele-
vant to attainment of the national primary ambient air quality standards.
The final conference version of the Act closely followed the more re-
strictive Senate version of the bill. 4 5  The Senate Report emphasized
that the deleterious effects of pollution on the public health made any
consideration of economic and technological hardship irrelevant to attain-
ment of the primary standard within the three-year deadline. 46  The
140 ARLINGTON HEARINGS REPORT, supra note 135, at 9.
141 OHIo HEARING EXAMINER'S REPORT, supra note 32, at 169-70: "An analysis of this
Record, as a whole, shows that reliable flue gas desulfurization technology which can be
applied by the Ohio electric utilities to achieve compliance with pertinent regulations has
not been demonstrated to a degree which would justify its installation."
142 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518, 2525 (1976).
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970), reprinted in U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADnIN. NEWS 5374, 5389 (1970). For an excellent discussion of the legislative
history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, see Bonine, The Evolution of 'Tech-
nology-Forcing' in the Clean Air Act, Envir. Rep. (BNA), Monograph No. 21 (July 25,
1975); Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEO. L.J.
153 (1972).
146 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1970):
In the Committee discussions, considerable concern was expressed regarding the
use of the concept of technical feasibility as the basis of ambient air standards.
The Committee determined that 1) the health of people is more important than the
question of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality standards pro-
tective of health is technically feasible; and, 2) the growth of pollution load in many
areas, even with application of available technology, would still be deleterious to
public health.
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Conference Committee adopted the Senate's three-year deadline as
opposed to the correspondent House provision which allowed for attain-
ment of both the primary and secondary standards within a reasonable
time period. The Conference Committee further strengthened the bill
through its requirement that the national standard must be met "as
expeditiously as practicable" but no later than three years from the date
of approval of the state plan. 14 7  In the Senate Oversight Hearings in
1972, Senator Eagleton reiterated the technology-forcing nature of the
1970 amendments. 48
Moreover, section 110(a)(2) of the Clean Air Act supports the con-
clusion that impracticability claims are irrelevant to the Administrator's
approval or disapproval of a state plan. That section enumerates eight
criteria prerequisite to approval of a state implementation plan, further
stating that the Administrator "shall" approve a plan which satisfies
those requirements. 14  A finding that the plan is economically and
technologically feasible is not one of the enumerated criteria. For state-
submitted plans, additional support for ignoring impracticability is found
in section 116, which permits states to enact more stringent regulations
than necessary to achieve the national primary standard within three
years.
50
3. The Circuit Court Interpretations
Despite the unequivocal legislative intent and the statutory language
discussed above, there existed an irreconcilable split among the cir-
cuits concerning the relevance of impracticability claims to approval of a
state plan. The Third Circuit had a sequence of four cases supporting
the position that the Administrator must consider such claims.' 5' In
Therefore, the Committee determined that existing sources of pollutants either
should meet the standard of the law or be closed down.
This particular excerpt has been widely cited as support for the "technology-forcing"
aspect of the Act. In particular, it was cited in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. at 2526,
as authority for the Supreme Court's holding.
W, 96 S. Ct. at 2526.
148 Hearings before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm.
on Public Works, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) [hereinafter cited as the Senate Oversight
Hearings of 1972].
On this question of an economic factor, I am as positive about this as a mortal
can be, that was specifically written out of the bill because many hours were spent
in conference debating the economic feasibility factor and the house had such
language in the bill as: "Giving due consideration to economic and technological
feasibility of compliance."
That appeared in more than one place in the House bill and it was stricken
from the bill in conference to go back to the Senate version which had no economic
factor as far as protection of public health was concerned.
Id. at 21.
"I8 See note 20 supra. See also 96 S. Ct. at 2525.
,so 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970). For a discussion of the effect of this provision upon
federally promulgated regulations, see notes 66-75 supra and accompanying text. The
interpretation of section 116 quoted in the text was confirmed by the Court in Union
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
151 Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA (Duquesne II), 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated,
96 S. Ct. 3185 (1976); St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, 508 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated,
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Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus,152 the plaintiffs sought to enjoin a federal
compliance order issued against them pursuant to section 113. The
plaintiffs had not filed a petition for review of the Administrator's ap-
proval of the Delaware plan under section 307(b)(1); instead they ap-
plied for a variance by the state agency which would insure a temporary
reprieve from state enforcement. While their application for a variance
was being considered, Getty attempted to restrain federal enforcement
by claiming that the primary sulfur dioxide standards had been met in
its region and that the federal compliance order was, therefore, unneces-
sary. Plaintiffs also contended that the emission limitation would sub-
ject them to unreasonable economic hardship.
The court denied plaintiffs' request for relief, holding that such alle-
gations constituted a direct challenge to the "necessity, reasonableness
and constitutionality"' 5 of the regulations in the state plan and, as
such, were reviewable only in a section 307(b)(1) challenge. The court
thus explicitly assumed that plaintiffs "could have raised the question of
economic hardship or lack of compelling necessity" in a section 307(b)(1)
hearing. 54 The "Getty Oil dilemma" is attributable to that assumption,
since section 307(b)(2) precludes review of any agency action in a fed-
eral enforcement proceeding if that action is reviewable under section
307(b)(1). 155  Because plaintiffs had failed to seek section 307(b)(1)
review within thirty days after the Administrator approved the state
plan, they were foreclosed from further judicial examination of that ap-
proval.156
In subsequent cases, the Third Circuit expanded the unsupported as-
sumption made in Getty Oil. In Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA
(Duquesne 1),157 the Administrator was instructed either to stay enforce-
ment until state appeals were completed or to conduct a limited legisla-
tive hearing on the questions of economic and technological feasibil-
ity.15 On remand to the agency, the Administrator chose to conduct a
hearing and found compliance to be both economically and technologi-
cally feasible for all petitioners except St. Joe Minerals.15 9 In so doing
the Administrator relied on the special report published by EPA based
on the public hearings in Arlington, Virginia, which analyzed nationwide
progress towards compliance with sulfur dioxide standards. 1 0
Separate appeals were filed by Duquesne Light Company and St.
96 S. Ct. 2196 (1976); Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA (Duquesne I), 481 F.2d I (3d Cir. 1973);
Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
152 467 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
153 Id. at 357 n.14.
15 Id. at 357.
M5 Section 307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970) provides: "Action of the Ad-
ministrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under paragraph (1)
shall not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement."
15 467 F.2d at 357-58 n.14.
7 481 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973).
1-1 Id. at 10.
"s Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA (Duquesne II), 522 F.2d 1186, 1191 (3d Cir. 1975).
160 AmRINGroN HEARINGS REPORT, see note 135 supra.
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Joe Minerals Corporation. The court of appeals in its second opinion
entitled Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA (Duquesne 11), reversed the Admin-
istrator's findings on remand as "arbitrary and capricious [and] an
abuse of discretion.' ' 61 In St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, the court
found that the judicial authority to reject a state plan on the basis of
economic or technological infeasibility was implicit in its remand to the
agency in Duquesne I. In reaching this conclusion, the Third Circuit
reasoned that "an essential underpinning" of its decision in Getty Oil
was that the court could have considered these factors in a section
307(b)(1) challenge. Thus, in St. Joe Minerals Corp. the court found
that "[i]f a court of appeals is empowered to review, and presumably
reverse, the Administrator's approval on technological and economic
grounds, then surely the Administrator has the authority to review the
plan on those same grounds and disapprove the plan, or a portion of it,
if he finds it unreasonable.' 16 2  The problem with this reasoning is
that the scope of judicial review does not determine the nature of the
agency's responsibilities.'6 To the contrary, if the Administrator is not
permitted to consider such claims, then their introduction by petitioners
in a suit for review of the Administrator's decision is legally irrelevant.1 64
In addition to the Third Circuit, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits held
that economic and technological considerations were "relevant factors"
to the Administrator's review of a state's plan. 65 The Fourth Circuit
adopted the Getty Oil position finding it to be supported by the scope
of judicial review of administrative actions as set forth in the Supreme
Court case of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.1
6 6
161 522 F.2d at 1196.
162 508 F.2d at 747.
163 For an attack on the logic of the court's statement, see Bleicher, Economic and
Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 HARV.
L. REV. 316, 347 (1975). The Supreme Court is in agreement. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA,
96 S. Ct. 2518, 2524 (1976).
164 Senate Oversight Hearings of 1972, supra note 148:
As a lawyer, if this is being tried in a court of law under theories of the admis-
sibility of evidence, if economic factors are not in the bill and are not to be con-
sidered as part of the criteria or standards, I think that evidence would be thrown
out as being irrelevant. It is of no moment to the attainment of the 1975 public
health standard.
Id. at 24 (remarks of Senator Eagleton).
165 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co.
v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
166 477 F.2d at 505. The standard of review set by the Supreme Court requires that
the courts, pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970),
make a finding that:
[T]he actual choice made was not "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law." . . . To make this finding the court
must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. . . . Although this
inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of re-
view is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (emphasis added).
The conflict revolved around the definition of "relevant factors." While some courts
held that the Administrator must consider "all relevant factors," see, e.g., Appalachian
Power v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 505 (4th Cir. 1973), others sought to determine which
19761
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Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit found it "inconceivable" that the Ad-
ministrator did not evaluate these relevant factors in determining
whether the plan was reasonably likely to achieve its intended results. 167
The Sixth Circuit in Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA deemed these factors
relevant but, in so doing, erroneously relied on the House Report 8
and on the guidelines issued to the states which urged them to consider
such factors in drafting their implementation plans.6 9
The five other circuits170 which considered this issue and reached the
opposite result emphasized the fact that the language of section 110
(a)(2) omits mention of economic and technological considerations from
the list of criteria specified for the Administrator's use in reviewing
state implementation plans.' 7' These decisions also focused on the tech-
nology-forcing character of the Clean Air Act. For example, the First
Circuit found that Congress had made a legislative judgment that con-
siderations affecting the public health took priority over any economic
considerations raised by industry. 72  The Seventh Circuit construed the
three-year deadline set by Congress for attainment of the primary stan-
dard as the point beyond which impracticability claims were irrele-
vant.
173
factors were relevant based upon the statutory language and the legislative history. See,
e.g., Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 214 (8th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2518
(1976).
'67 477 F.2d at 506-07. The court then ordered the Administrator to certify to the
court the record upon which he had acted.
168 481 F.2d at 168-69. The court's confusion may be traced to the fact that the Act
carried the House bill number. See 3 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 5356 (1970). See note 196 infra for a discussion of the holding. Criticism of this
case has been strong. Bonine, The Evolution of 'Technology-Forcing' in the Clean Air
Act, Envir. Rep. (BNA), Monograph No. 21 at 22 n.329 (July 25, 1975); Bleicher, Economic
and Technical Feasibility in Clean Air Act Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89
HARV. L. REV. 316, 337-38 (1975).
169 40 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1972). These guidelines were criticized by Richard Ayres during
the 1972 Senate Oversight Hearings. Ayres told the Committee that the guidelines were
being construed by the courts to require that the federal Administrator consider these
factors when approving the state plan. Senator Eagleton contended that the guidelines
were consistent with the congressional intent that such matters be handled at the local
level, and did not support the court's position in Buckeye Power. Senate Oversight
Hearings of 1972, supra note 148, at 24.
170 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975); Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co.
v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,
507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974);
Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974).
171 See, e.g., Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1975):
"Furthermore, in view of the numerous criteria which section 110(a)(2) specifies for the
Administrator's consideration prior to approval of a state plan, we find the absence of any
reference to economic or technological factors highly significant." The legislative history
was heavily relied upon to support the court's interpretation of this congressional omission.
172 South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 675 (1st Cir. 1974):
Thus, insofar as petitioners claim that either EPA or ourselves would be empowered
to reject measures necessary to ensure compliance with primary air quality stan-
dards simply because after weighing the advantages of safe air against the eco-
nomic detriment, we thought the latter consideration took priority, petitioners
would be incorrect. Congress has already made a judgment the other way, and
EPA and the courts are bound.
173 Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509.F.2d 839, 844 (7th Cir. 1975). The Supreme
Court has apparently adopted this view:
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The facts in the Eighth Circuit case of Union Electric Co. v. EPA'74
were very similar to those in the 1973 Getty Oil decision. It was the
only case which had arisen since Getty Oil where the petitioners had
not filed a section 307(b)(1) challenge for review of the state implemen-
tation plan within thirty days of the Administrator's approval. In-
stead, they had originally sought a state variance, but while awaiting a
decision from the state they were notified by the Administrator of viola-
tions of the sulfur dioxide regulations. In order to avoid federal enforce-
ment and the dilemma faced by the Getty Oil plaintiffs, 75 petitioners
sought jurisdiction through a provision in section 307 which extended
review beyond the thirty day period for grounds arising subsequent to
the expiration of that period. Union Electric claimed that the following
grounds arose after the statutory 30-day period: (1) shortages of low sul-
fur coal - allegedly attributable to the Arab oil embargo; (2) technolog-
ical infeasibility of scrubbers; (3) exorbitant costs of scrubbers; (4) dif-
ficulty in obtaining financing; (5) evidence challenging the existence of
a need for sulfur dioxide standards to protect the public health; and
(6) the contention that compliance was unnecessary to attain the pri-
mary standard. 176  Rather than finding that these grounds actually arose
subsequent to expiration of the 30-day period, the court chose to assume
this as a fact for purposes of determining jurisdiction. The court then
considered the scope of review under section 307 and concluded that,
even if these grounds arose after the 30-day period, they would not be
relevant to the Administrator's approval of the state plan. 77 After ex-
amining the applicable legislative history and the other circuit court de-
cisions, the Eighth Circuit concluded that economic and technological
considerations were not subject to section 307(b)(1) judicial review, but
rather were, more appropriately, legislative judgments.'17  The Eighth
Circuit's decision was appealed to the Supreme Court.
4. The Supreme Court's Decision and Questions Remaining
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Union Electric argued that there
was a stronger reason for judicial review of economic and technological
claims which arose subsequent to the Administrator's initial approval of
the state plan. 79  The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating
that the new grounds must be ones which, had they existed at the time
of approval of the state plan, the Administrator would have had to con-
Whatever room there is for considering claims of infeasibility in the attainment
of primary standards must lie in the phrase, ["as expeditiously as practicable but
• . . in no case later than three years . . ."] which is, of course, relevant only in
evaluating those implementation plans that attempt to achieve the primary stan-
dard in less than three years.
96 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (1976).
174 515 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1975).
175 See notes 152-56 supra and accompanying text.
,6 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 210 n.8 (8th Cir. 1975).
It Id. at 214.
17i Id. at 219.
1 9 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, Brief for Petitioner at 13.
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sider. 18 0 The Court analyzed the statute and found that it was "ap-
parent on the face of § 110(a)(2)" that the Administrator should consider
only the factors enumerated by statute and, moreover, that he must
approve every plan which meets those requirements. 1 ' In addition,
the Court noted that the three-year deadline "leaves no room for claims
of technological or economic infeasibility."'182 Construing section 110
(a)(2) in conjunction with section 116, the Court held that "the States
may adopt emission standards stricter than the national standards."'
83
This analysis led the Court to the same conclusion reached by the Eighth
Circuit: the Administrator had no authority to reject a state plan on the
grounds that it was economically or technologically impracticable; and,
therefore, a court reviewing the Administrator's action could not set
aside a plan on those grounds.
As previously discussed, when the Administrator disapproves a por-
tion of a state plan or a state fails to submit a portion of its plan,
the Administrator must promulgate regulations for the state pursuant to
section 110(c).18 4  The question posed in such situations is whether
the Administrator must consider claims of impracticability when he de-
velops regulations for the state. The Supreme Court has yet to resolve
this question. 85  The federal-state structure of the Clean Air Act af-
forded the states the opportunity to make policy decisions regarding the
"mix of emission limitations," and the states were invited to consider
impracticability claims by industries within the state when devising their
implementation plans. 8 6 The state was free to adopt regulations more
stringent than necessary to satisfy the primary standards. In so doing,
the states could further impose a "technology-forcing" three-year dead-
line for compliance with the secondary air quality standards. As long
as the federal minimum was assured, the Administrator was required
to approve the state plan.' While it seems settled that the Adminis-
trator has authority to promulgate only those regulations necessary for
a state to meet the national standard, it remains an open question
whether the Administrator must consider cost and availability of tech-
nology in developing such regulations.
The fact that the federal agency conducted hearings, received writ-
ten comments from interested parties throughout Ohio, and spent
eight months incorporating those comments into final regulations, sug-
gests that impracticability claims have been duly considered by the
agency. Rather than inviting a challenge on those grounds, the agency
has adopted the safest route by considering industry's claims to the ex-
tent possible and by adopting a mix of emission limitations only as
180 96 S. Ct. 2518, 2524 (1976).
1MI d. at 2525.
Ms' Id. at 2526.
1'3 Id. at 2528. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.
184 See note 57 supra.
1s5 96 S. Ct. at 2527 n.7.
s86 See note 24 supra and accompanying text. See also 40 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1972).
117 96 S. Ct. at 2526-29.
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stringent as is necessary to meet the primary national ambient air qual-
ity standard within three years.
5. When Claims of Impracticability Can Be Raised
It should be recalled that the scope of judicial review under sections
307(b)(1) and 307(b)(2) are mutually exclusive. 188 Section 307(b)(2)
provides that: "Action of the Administrator with respect to which review
could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to
judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. '"'8 9
Thus, the decision made with regard to the scope of review under sec-
tion 307(b)(1) will predetermine, to some extent, the kinds of defenses
which may be raised in federal enforcement proceedings under section
113. Because the Getty Oil court determined that economic and tech-
nological claims could have been raised in a section 307(b)(1) challenge,
petitioners were foreclosed from raising those claims in federal enforce-
ment proceedings. 90  The converse, however, is not necessarily true.
Those circuits which have determined that economic and technological
hardship is not reviewable in a section 307(b)(1) challenge to the Ad-
ministrator's approval of a state plan are not in agreement that such
claims could be raised in enforcement proceedings.' 9 '
Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA'9' brought to light a point
raised earlier by the Sixth Circuit in Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA.193
As discussed previously, 94 the Sixth Circuit found that under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the Administrator was required to conduct
hearings at the federal level prior to approval of a state's plan to afford
opportunities for public participation in the decision-making process.
That court also considered section 703 of the A.P.A. which provides:
"Except to the extent that prior, adequate, and exclusive opportunity for
judicial review is provided by law, agency action is subject to judicial
review in civil or criminal proceedings for judicial enforcement.' ' 95
The Sixth Circuit ruled that there had not been an adequate hearing at
the federal level on the individual claims presented and, therefore,
that those claims could be raised as a defense in subsequent federal
enforcement proceedings. 96
188 See discussion of Getty Oil at notes 152-56 supra and accompanying text.
189 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970).
190 467 F.2d at 357-58 n.14. Accord, Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA, 522 F.2d 1186,
1189 (3d Cir. 1975); Appalachian Power, Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 499 (4th Cir. 1973).
Cf. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 173 (6th Cir. 1973).
191 Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 173 (6th Cir. 1973). Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975), held that such claims could be raised
in enforcement proceedings. Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), by
implication, ruled that such claims could never be raised, since they were political ques-
tions.
192 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975).
193 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
194 See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
1955 U.S.C. § 703 (1970).
198 481 F.2d at 173. There seems to be some confusion over the holding of the Sixth
Circuit in Buckeye Power. For instance, the court in Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d
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The Seventh Circuit agreed that such claims could be raised in en-
forcement proceedings because their decision precluded review of these
claims under section 307(b)(1). They further asserted that such claims
were far more appropriate for judicial review on an individual basis
since review under section 307(b)(1) would require rejection of an entire
state plan if any person could demonstrate infeasibility as the emission
limitations of the plan applied to him. 97
The Eighth Circuit discussed with disfavor the Buckeye Power deci-
sion, but failed to specifically hold that infeasibility claims could not be
raised in enforcement proceedings. 198 They did, however, maintain
that such claims are "essentially legislative judgments as to where the
public interest lies" and would be decided in the legislative arena if the
situation became serious enough. 99 In argument before the.Supreme
Court, the Administrator took the position that he must consider claims
of economic or technological impracticability in determining the ap-
propriateness of an enforcement order under section 113(a)(4) .200
Section 113(a)(4) requires the Administrator to set up a compliance
206, 217 (8th Cir. 1975), noted that the Buckeye court held "review of petitioner's claims
of economic and technological infeasibility of compliance could not be obtained in a
§ 307(b)(1) review proceeding." In contrast, the Bleicher article, note 168 supra, at 340,
states that "Buckeye Power thus requires the Administrator to consider feasibility factors
in legislative hearings prior to SIP approval (an action subject to judicial review under
section 307)."
The Buckeye court found that hearings at the state level were inadequate to protect
petitioners from federal enforcement actions. Therefore, the Buckeye court ordered the
Administrator to comply with section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which
mandates that the agency entertain comments from interested parties before deciding
whether to approve a state plan. 481 F.2d at 170-71. Such action would appear to be
reviewable under section 307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970). Later in the opinion,
however, the court asserted that they had found review of petitioners' claims could not
have been obtained under section 307(b)(1) and that, therefore, the claims could be
raised as a defense in subsequent enforcement proceedings. Id. at 173. While sections
307(b)(1) and (2) are on their face mutually exclusive, it would appear that the Sixth
Circuit provided for review of infeasibility claims under both sections. The Union Elec-
tric interpretation of Buckeye was not entirely incorrect, however, since the Buckeye
court stated that they found review under section 307(b)(1) could not be obtained. The
only plausible interpretation of Buckeye is that the court was requiring the Administrator
to conduct legislative hearings for presentation of economic and technological claims
but deeming such factors as non-reviewable in a section 307(b)(1) hearing.
This inconsistency does not necessarily detract from the Buckeye court's reliance
on section 703 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Since it has now been determined
that infeasibility claims can not be raised in a section 307(b)(1) challenge to the Ad-
ministrator's approval of a state plan, section 307(b)(2) affords a possible forum for such
claims. See Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975).
19' 509 F.2d at 845:
To hold that approval or adoption of a state's plan is "unreasonable" or "capri-
cious" on the basis of its application to a particular facility or company would
undermine the purpose and intent of the legislation under consideration, and
would require rejection of a state's plan if any person arguably subject to the plan
could demonstrate its inability to adapt to the emission limitations set forth there-
in. No fair reading of the Clean Air Act supports such a proposition.
198 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 217 (8th Cir. 1975).
119 Id. at 219. In support of this view, see Bleicher, Economic and Technical Feasi-
bility in Clean Air Act Enforcement Against Stationary Sources, 89 IARv. L. REV. 316,
323-25 (1975).
0 Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, Respondent's Brief at 36 n.34.
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schedule that he determines is "reasonable, taking into account the
seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts to comply.""2 '
The Supreme Court agreed with the Administrator's view that claims
of economic or technological feasibility "are relevant to fashioning an
appropriate compliance order under § 113(a)(4). '"202  The Court also
noted other occasions where such claims could be raised most important of
which was the opportunity to submit comments during the state hear-
ings before adoption of the state plans. Applications for variances and
review in state courts for denial of same were other forums mentioned
by the Court. Thus, the Court found that the Act provided "ample
opportunity" to raise such claims without interfering with attainment of
the national standards.20 3
The Supreme Court did not consider whether those claims could be
raised in other proceedings under section 113.204 For example, if the
Administrator decides against issuance of a compliance order, he may
file civil suit for injunctive relief or seek criminal penalties. Whether
infeasibility may be raised as a defense under those circumstances was
not addressed,20 5 nor was the even more perplexing question whether
those claims could be raised as defenses to citizen enforcement suits
brought under section 304.208
In cryptic terms, the Court suggested that, at some stage, due process
may require an opportunity for judicial review of a claim of impractica-
bility.207  Since those claims cannot be raised in a section 307(b)(1)
challenge to the plan, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits may be correct in
referring to section 703 of the Administrative Procedure Act and in hold-
ing that impracticability claims can be raised in any civil or criminal
enforcement proceeding. This result, although contrary to congressional
intent, may be required to justify the imposition of tremendous finan-
cial burdens on individual polluters. On the other hand, the taking of
property without due process may be narrowly construed to avoid an in-
terpretation contrary to congressional intent. The First Circuit in South
Terminal Corp. v. EPA, noted that the regulations challenged in that
case, which restricted the use of property, did not constitute a taking. 20 8
A continuation of the Court's pattern of strict statutory construction of
the Clean Air Act would signify adherence to the principle that these
pollutant sources must either "meet the standard of the law or be closed
down."209  The concurring opinion in Union Electric advocated some
balancing of the equities in situations where a plant may be closed down.
They posed the question whether it would be in the best interest of the
201 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(4) (1970).
202 96 S. Ct. at 2530.
203 Id.
204 Id. n.18.
205 id.
206 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970).
207 96 S. Ct. at 2531 n.19. The Court declined to grant certiorari on the question as
the claim was neither presented to, nor considered by, the court of appeals.
200 504 F.2d 654, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1974).
209 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
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public health to close down an electric utility for noncompliance with
pollution standards. 210  However, the concurring justices left this deci-
sion to Congress stating that if such a devastating consequence were
likely to occur, Congress "would strike a different balance."21 1
IV. A REPEAT PERFORMANCE BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT?
As previously noted,212 section 307(b)(1) challenges to the federal
sulfur dioxide regulations have been filed in the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals. In response to a request by petitioners for a stay of enforce-
ment, the court has issued an order based on administrative due process
grounds. This court action is reminiscent of its earlier decision in Buck-
eye Power, Inc. v. EPA.213 The stay was issued to enable the federal
EPA to receive further comments from interested parties concerning the
final sulfur dioxide regulations.
Extensive hearings were held when the regulations were proposed and
revisions were made before final promulgation in order to accommodate
suggestions made at those public hearings.214 While section 110(c)
requires the Administrator to conduct hearings within a state "on any
proposed regulation," there appears to be no statutory provisions requir-
ing additional hearings or a written comment period once final pro-
mulgation has occurred. 215 Additionally, the Administrative Procedure
Act,21 6 as interpreted by the courts,217 does not require a new public
comment period when changes are made in response to suggestions of
interested parties. The District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion by
Judge Leventhal, noted that: "The requirement of submission of a pro-
posed rule for comment does not automatically generate a new oppor-
tunity for comment merely because the rule promulgated by the agency
differs from the rule it proposed, partly at least in response to submis-
sions." 2'1  That court was cautious, however, in limiting the holding
to the facts at hand, stating that under the circumstances the lack of a
right to a hearing was neither a violation of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act nor of due process.21 9 In dictum, the court noted that even if
a petition for reconsideration or modification were granted, "those peti-
tions could not have affected or deferred the finality of the EPA deci-
sion."220  If Judge Leventhal's conclusions are correct, the Sixth Circuit
210 96 S. Ct. at 2532 (Powell, J., concurring).
IH Id.
:12 See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
213 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973). See also note 42 supra.
214 See note 61 supra and accompanying text.
215 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970) (emphasis added).
216 Specifically, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3) (1970).
217 Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976) and cases cited therein.
See also South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 659 (1st Cir. 1974) ("Parties have
no right to insist that a rule remain frozen in its vestigal form."); International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
218 International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
219 Id. See also Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 48-49 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
220 Id.
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has erred in granting a stay of enforcement to appellants even if its
finding of a violation of administrative due process is meritorious.
The petitioners are expected to challenge the federal sulfur dioxide
regulations on the ground that they are more stringent than necessary
to bring the state's air quality within the national primary standard.
Such a challenge will result in a highly technical battle of experts to
determine the accuracy of the computer models used by the federal
agency. The federal EPA has spent more than two years developing
these regulations. Great care was taken to insure that the regulations
could withstand a section 307 challenge. 22 ' In view of the complexity
of its task and the inherent difficulties with computer modeling, this
would seem to be an appropriate case for judicial deference to agency
expertise. 22
2
Another issue which may arise in the Sixth Circuit concerns the Ad-
ministrator's duty to consider impracticability claims when he develops
regulations for a state. This issue is theoretically based upon the fact
that the states are urged to consider such claims when they devise their
own implementation plans.2 3  Two things militate against a successful
challenge to the regulations on the grounds of impracticability. First,
there is no statutory requirement that the states take such factors into
consideration. Nevertheless, the federal EPA allowed interested parties
to raise such claims at the public hearings when the regulations were
proposed and made adjustments where possible to accommodate valid
criticisms before final promulgation. Secondly, if as the EPA contends,
its regulations are only as stringent as necessary to meet the national
primary standard, then claims of impracticability are irrelevant. The
two most recent Supreme Court decisions, Train v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.224 and Union Electric Co. v. EPA,225 have em-
phasized the importance of the national standards. In Union Electric,
the Court found that prompt attainment of the national standards was
the primary goal of the 1970 Act. The Court refused to render Congress'
technology-forcing policy a nullity by permitting consideration of claims
of technological and economic feasibility.22 6
The possibility that the Sixth Circuit will once again invalidate Ohio's
sulfur dioxide regulations motivates a consideration of whether the legis-
lative intent of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 would thereby
have been thwarted by industry and the courts. In this regard, it is in-
teresting to note that the proposed congressional amendments to the
221 See note 62 supra.
222 See notes 76-82 supra and accompanying text.
223 See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 87 (1975).
See aLso 40 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1972).
224 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
225 96 S. Ct. 2518 (1976).
226 Id. at 2531:
Technology forcing is a concept somewhat new to our national experience and it
necessarily entails certain risks. But Congress considered those risks in passing the
1970 Amendments and decided that the dangers posed by uncontrolled air pollu-
tion made them worth taking. Petitioner's theory would render that considered
legislative judgment a nullity, and that is a result we refuse to reach.
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Clean Air Act have retained and strengthened their original technology-
forcing character despite industry resistance.
V. 1976-77 AMENDMENTS
The Senate Public Works Committee and the House of Representa-
tives Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce authored two
separate bills to amend the Clean Air Act.227 Both bills passed their
respective bodies during the second session of the ninety-fourth Con-
gress. A Conference version also emerged, 228 but no final action was
taken during that session. A number of the changes may affect the
future of stationary source compliance including amendments relating
to state implementation plans, significant deterioration, and federal
enforcement. These changes will be surveyed.
A. State Implementation Plans
The Conference Bill requires each state to submit to the Administra-
tor, within 120 days from enactment, a list of the state's air quality con-
trol regions and the current status of air quality for each regulated
pollutant within those regions.2 29 Sulfur oxides and particulate matter
are treated separately from mobile-source related pollutants. The state
must identify those regions that are not in compliance with the primary
standard for each pollutant; and additionally, those regions that are
not in compliance with any secondary standard.2 30 The Administrator
has authority to modify a state's list so long as he gives the state notice
and an opportunity to show why such modification would be improper.
The information supplied by the states will be used to implement the
controversial significant deterioration policy 23' and will aid in the de-
velopment of the transportation control plans necessary to attainment of
the primary standards for pollutants such as carbon monoxide, nitrogen
oxides, hydrocarbons, and photochemical oxidants.232 Two new sub-
227 S. 3219, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
228 CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
229 Id. § 103 (amending § 107 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1857c-2 (1970)).
230 Specifically, each state must designate the air quality control regions which:
(A) do not meet a national primary ambient air quality standard for any air
pollutant other than sulfur oxides or particulate matter;
(B) do not meet, or in the judgment of the State may not in the time period
required by an applicable implementation plan attain or maintain any national
primary ambient air quality standard for sulfur oxides or particulate matter;
(C) do not meet a national secondary ambient air quality standard for any
pollutant;
(D) cannot be classified under subparagraph (B) or (C) of this paragraph on
the basis of available information, for ambient air quality levels for sulfur oxides
or particulate matter; or
(E) cannot be classified under subparagraph (A) or (C) of this paragraph on
the basis of available information, for ambient air quality levels for any air pollutant
other than sulfur oxides or particulate matter.
Id. § 103 (proposed § 107(d)(1)(A)-(E), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(d)(1)(A)-(E)).
231 See notes 235-60 infra and accompanying text.
232 A detailed discussion of transportation-related amendments is beyond the scope
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sections under section 110(a)(2) will incorporate the significant de-
terioration policy 2 33 and the transportation control plans2 34 into the
individual state implementation plans.
B. Significant Deterioration
Some background is necessary for an adequate understanding of the
amendment that incorporates a policy of no significant deterioration of
air quality into each state implementation plan.2 35 In the 1972 district
court decision of Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,236 the Administrator's
approval of state plans which failed to provide against degradation of
clean air areas was successfully challenged. The court relied on the
1970 Act's predecessor wherein the terms "protect and enhance" were
first incorporated into the Act's statement of purpose. The court also
relied on HEW regulations employing the words "significant deteriora-
tion" to implement the -Act's purpose of protection and enhancement.
Reliance was also placed on a statement contained in the legislative
history of the 1970 amendments:
In areas where current air pollution levels are already equal to or
better than the air quality goals, [the primary and secondary
standards] the Secretary shall not approve any implementation
plan which does not provide, to the maximum extent practicable,
for the continued maintenance of such ambient air quality.
37
The district court's injunction was affirmed by an equally divided
Supreme Court.238  In order to comply with the injunction the EPA
published regulations for the prevention of significant deterioration of
air quality in areas where the air pollution levels were already below
the national standards.239  Nevertheless, there has remained a great
deal of confusion about the policy of nondegradation not the least of
which was generated by the less than "definitive" Supreme Court af-
of this Note; however, a brief reference may be found in text accompanying notes 128-
29 supra.
Ma CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 123(c)(1) (1976) (amending § 110(a)(2),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2) (1970)). This provision incorporates into the criteria listed in
section 110(a)(2) a requirement of compliance with the policy of "prevention of significant
deterioration of air quality." Id. See also id. § 123(a) (adding § 160(c)(1)).
24 Id. § 124(b) (amending § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970)).
135 See generally Note, Review of EPA's Significant Deterioration Regulations: An
Example of the Difficulties of the Agency-Court Partnership in Environmental Law, 61
VA. L. REV. 1115 (1975); Comment, Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus-On a Clear Day, 4
EcoLocy L.Q. 739 (1975).
2" 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam, 4 E.R.C. 1815 (D.C. Cir. 1972), aff'd
sub nom. by an equally divided Court, Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
237 344 F. Supp at 255 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 2 (1970)).
One commentator has noted that the court actually misquoted the Senate Report which
reads "'the Secretary should not approve" any plan which does not prevent significant
deterioration of air quality in clean areas. Bolbach, The Courts and the Clean Air Act,
ENviR. REP. (BNA), Monograph No. 19 at 22 (July 12, 1974).
238 Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
239 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1972).
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firmance of a cursory district court opinion.2 4  The definition of what
is significant deterioration has been uncertain; the natural limits appear
to be zero deterioration at one end and the secondary standards at the
other. The 1976-77 amendments would clarify the policy and, above
all, signify its reaffirmance by Congress. As was discussed earlier, 241
such a policy is necessary in order to prevent the dispersion of polluters
into outlying areas thus, in time, creating a situation in which the air
is uniformly dirty at a level just below the national secondary standards.
The regulations issued in response to the Sierra Club decision were
unsatisfactory. The guidelines provided for the division of air quality
control regions into three categories.2 42  Initially all areas were desig-
nated class II with redesignation to be accomplished by the states sub-
ject to approval by the Administrator. In redesignating areas, the states
were to consider future growth patterns and social, environmental, and
economic impact.
Maximum allowable increases in pollution levels were assigned to
each class. Class I areas were the most restrictive with incremental
increases in pollution levels for sulfur oxides and particulates severely
limited. Class II areas permitted a greater increase, and class III areas
were limited only by the national standards. There was no require-
ment, however, that any area be designated as class I and, likewise,
there was no precaution against the designation of large numbers of
regions as class III. This left wide discretion with the individual state
subject only to the requirement of federal approval. The Administrator
could disapprove only those state classification plans that arbitrarily
disregarded relevant considerations. The wide discretion thus left to the
states has been a strongly criticized weakness of the EPA regulations.2 43
The Conference Bill proposes to amend Title I of the Clean Air Act
to include a special section dealing with nondegradation.2 44  The pro-
240 The EPA's original regulations, issued in 1973, were prefaced by the statement
that: "In EPA's view, there has been no definitive judicial resolution of the issue whether
the Clean Air Act requires prevention of significant deterioration of air quality." 38
Fed. Reg. 18,985 (1973). The fact that the district court's opinion was only a short
memorandum opinion issued pursuant to a request for a preliminary injunction, plus the
fact that it was affirmed by a four-four vote in the Supreme Court has caused con-
siderable uncertainty. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has reaffirmed their
earlier position in a recent case, Sierra Club v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
The opinion, written by Judge J. Skelly Wright, affirmed the EPA's regulations and found
the prevention of significant deterioration to be implicit in the Clean Air Act.
241 See notes 94-97 supra and accompanying text.
24 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1972).
243 See, e.g., Note, Review of EPA's Significant Deterioration Regulations: An Ex-
ample of the Difficulties of the Agency-Court Partnership in Environmental Law, 61 VA.
L. REV. 1115, 1139-40, 1158-67 (1975). "By giving the states virtually complete control
over the classification of areas within their borders, the new regulations allow the states
to determine what constitutes 'significant deterioration'." Id. at 1159. Comment, Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus - On a Clear Day, 4 EcoLoGY L.Q. 739, 759 (1975):
Without the strong guiding hand of the federal government states may succumb to
economic and political pressures to compete with other states for industry, by
adopting a lax definition of "significant" deterioration, or by classifying as many
clean air regions as possible as Class III. Viewed in this light, EPA's permissive-
ness regarding state NSD [no significant deterioration] policies may be the single
most important factor endangering our remaining clean air resources.
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vision would apply to all air quality control regions which the states
maintain are within both the primary and secondary standards for sulfur
dioxide and particulates. 24 5  In addition to the general purpose of pro-
tecting the public health and welfare from the adverse effects of pollu-
tion, this amendment is designed "to preserve, protect, and enhance the
air quality in national parks . . . and other areas of special national
or regional natural, recreational, scenic, or historic value.
'
"
246
In order to effectuate these purposes, the amendment lists certain
areas as class I and mandates that they remain so classified. 247 All
other regions will initially be designated as class II, and certain of those
areas may never be redesignated as class 111.248 The state has discre-
tion to designate other areas as class 1.249 Redesignation of an area
as class III, however, requires adherence to detailed procedures, in-
cluding public hearings and the approval of a majority of the residents
of the area to be redesignated.
250
New major emitting facilities which plan to locate in a no signifi-
cant deterioration area must apply for a permit from the state. That
permit, when issued, will require emission limitations to insure that air
quality will not deteriorate beyond the prescribed increment .2 5  The
permit will also require that the facility adopt the "best available con-
trol technology." 252  The state is required to provide an opportunity
244 CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 123(a) (1976). This section proposes
to add a new section 160 to Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Subsequent
citations will refer to proposed section 160.
245 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(b)(1)). That is, those regions identified by a state
pursuant to proposed section 107(d)(1)(D) or (E). See note 230 supra.
246 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(a)(2)).
247 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(b)(2)) specifies:
[A]ll international parks, and each national wilderness area, and national memo-
rial park which exceeds five thousand acres in size, and each national park
which exceeds six thousand acres in size and which is in existence on the date of
enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1976, shall be Class I areas.
248 Id. 9 123(a) (proposed § 160(d)(1)(A)-(C)):
(A) an area established as class I under subsection (b)(2),
(B) a national monument, a national primitive area, a national preserve, a
national recreation area, a national wild and scenic river, a national wildlife refuge,
a national lakeshore and seashore, which exceeds 10,000 acres in size, or
(C) a national park or national wilderness area established after the date of
enactment of this Act which exceeds 10,000 acres in size ....
249 Id. 9 123(a) (proposed § 160(b)(4)).
250 Id. 9. 123(a) (proposed §§ 160(d)(1)(D), 160(d)(2)(A)).
251 Id. 9 123(a) (proposed 9 160(e)(1)(A)(i)).
252 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(e)(1)(A)(iv)). Best available control technology is
defined as:
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pol-
lutant . . . which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking into
account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, de-
termines is achievable for such facility through application of production processes
and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning or treat-
ment for control of each such pollutant.
Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(g)(4)). The interjection of this term leaves considerable dis-
cretion with the states the permitting authority. That discretion is exercisable, however,
only within the bounds of the permitted increment for the class in question.
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for public hearings on the proposed permit.253  Additional precautions
are taken when the planned facility is expected to effect a class I area. 254
Though the requirements of section 160 (nondegradation) have been
injected into section 110(a)(2) (state implementation plans),2 55 it does
not appear that Congress intends that the Administrator promulgate
significant deterioration plans for the state, as is required when other
portions of a plan are missing or unsatisfactory. This curious twist is
not stated in the text of the amendments but is suggested in the Com-
mittee comments: "EPA may not promulgate the portion of a State Plan
implementing nondegrada.tion requirements."2 5 6  This is an apparent
exception to section 110(a)(4), which imposes a mandatory duty on the
Administrator with regard to other portions of state implementation
plans. 25 7
The Conference Committee further stated that "[t]he Administrator
shall issue orders and seek other action to prevent issuance of an im-
proper permit.'" 258  This comment relates to a specific provision of the
amendment, .which imposes a mandatory duty on the Administrator to
issue compliance orders under the federal enforcement section 113 and
to seek injunctive relief when necessary to prevent the issuance of a
permit that does not conform to the requirements of section 160.259
The composite result of these two sentences in the Committee Report
would be to preclude federal promulgation while insisting upon federal
enforcement.
Passage of the 1976-77 amendments with the inclusion of such a
clearly delineated significant deterioration policy is necessary to the
continued success of the Clean Air Act. Considerable concern has been
expressed that the adoption of this policy would halt industrial progress
and expansion as well as greatly increase the costs of production.2 60
253 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(e)(1)(A)(ii)).
254 Whenever notice is filed by one of the parties authorized by statute to the effect
that "emissions from a proposed major emitting facility may cause or contribute to a
change in the air quality" in a class I area, the applicant will bear the burden of es-
tablishing that the facility will not contribute to a cumulative change in air quality in
excess of the permitted increment. Should the projected increase in pollution levels be
less than the statutory increment, a permit will not be issued where it can be established
that the air quality related considerations outweigh any merits to the proposed location.
Where the projected increase exceeds the statutory amount a permit may nevertheless be
issued if the applicant can adequately establish that there will be no adverse impact on the
air quality related value of said land. Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(e)(1)(C)(ii)).
These latter two provisions should be viewed as a valve through which accommoda-
tion to peculiar circumstances may be obtained. Nevertheless, the inclusion of such a valve
provides an avenue for dispute and should be used sparingly. The statutory increments
are appropriate for the usual case and the presumption of their applicability must be
rebutted on a case by case basis.
25 See note 233 supra.
25 CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1976).
257 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(4) (1970).
25' CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess 103 (1976).
259 Id. § 123(a) (proposed § 160(i)(1)).
260 See, e.g., ENVIR. REP. (BNA), 7 Current Dev. 10, 13-14 (May 7, 1976); id. at 45
(May 14, 1976); id. at 204 (June 4, 1976). For a criticism of those remarks, see, e.g.,
id. at 140 (May 28, 1976); id. at 237-38 (June 11, 1976).
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Attempts were made to delete this portion from the amendments, but
thus far such attempts have proved unsuccessful. It is hoped that con-
gressional support will remain firm and that the nation will soon have a
"definitive" policy for maintaining and preserving the nation's clean
air areas.
C. Federal Enforcement
As the process of developing and approving state implementation
plans comes to a close (except for revisions required to conform with
the 1976-77 amendments), enforcement will become the focus for the
success or failure of air pollution control. Although the intent of Con-
gress was attainment of the primary standards by 1975, extensions
until 1977 are quite common.261  The Conference Bill would amend
section 113 through the addition of a new subsection providing for the
issuance of enforcement orders by the state or the Administrator and
specifying compliance dates as late as January 1, 1979.262 The en-
forcement order is to be source-specific and thus would not result in
amendment of the deadline for an entire state-wide implementation
plan, but rather would provide an exception to compliance with the
plan for the individual sources. Certain conditions must be met in
order to issue such orders including: a public hearing, compliance
schedules and timetables, reasonable interim control measures, final
compliance by January 1, 1979, and a provision for imposition of a
monthly penalty in the event that a major emitting facility is not in com-
pliance by the 1979 deadline. 263  If the Administrator finds that an
enforcement order issued by a state does not satisfy these minimum
requirements, he has an affirmative duty to object and to issue a federal
enforcement order in its place. 6 4
Once a facility has received such an enforcement order, it will be
211 It was noted in the EPA's annual report to Congress that more than half the air
quality control regions were not in compliance with the primary standard for particulates
during 1975. Fourteen percent of the regions did not meet the sulfur dioxide standard.
ENVIR. REP. (BNA), 7 Current Dev. 64 (May 21, 1976).
262 CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(a) (1976) (amending § 113
(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970)). Subsequent citations will refer to proposed sec-
tion 113. The bill provides that:
A State (or, after thirty days notice to the State, the Administrator) may issue an
enforcement order for any stationary source which specifies a date for final com-
pliance with an applicable emission limitation later than the date for attainment of
any national ambient air quality standard specified in the applicable implemen-
tation plan: Provided, That . . . (D) the order provides for final compliance . . .
as expeditiously as practicable, but in no event later than January 1, 1979 ...
Il:' Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 113(d)(1)(A)-(E), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(d)(1)(A)-(E)). The
monthly penalty for failure to meet the 1979 deadline will be discussed in more detail
itfra at notes 272-78 and accompanying text.
184 While the duty is an affirmative one, it does not appear to be mandatory. Id.
§ 111(a) (proposed § 113(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(d)(2)): "An enforcement order pro-
posed by a State shall issue . . . unless the Administrator, within ninety days of receipt
of any proposed order, objects in writing to the issuance of such order as not consistent with
the requirements of paragraph (1) of this subsection." The Administrator may not object
to any enforcement order that is more stringent than necessary to meet those requirements.
Id.
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free from citizen suits under section 304 and from federal enforcement
proceedings under other subsections of section 113.265 This provision
minimizes situations where a state has granted a variance to a source
but where federal enforcement proceedings may be instituted because
the federal EPA has not approved the state variance. If, however, a
source violates the enforcement order, then the other measures provided
by section 113 will apply.266 The amendments do not state whether
noncompliance with an enforcement order would constitute a violation
for which enforcement by citizens would be possible. 27
Other requirements, such as a demonstration of technological in-
feasibility or economic hardship, do not appear to be mandated in order
for any source to obtain an enforcement order with compliance thereby
extended as late as January 1, 1979.26 Due to the minimal require-
ments provided by the Conference Bill,269 it seems likely that this
amendment would result in a widespread practice of extensions through
the end of 1978. It must be assumed that such extensions were fore-
seen and intended by the Conference Committee. Any compliance order
issued under section 113(a), and any consent decree obtained prior to
enactment of the 1976 amendments, will remain in effect only to the
extent that they are not in conflict with the new 1979 deadline.
270
Therefore, any consent decrees heretofore signed by the EPA, with
compliance dates of 1979 and beyond, will be void and must be modified
to comply with the amended guidelines. Beyond January 1, 1979, how-
2 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 113(d)(7)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(d)(7)(A)).
266 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 113(d)(7)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(d)(7)(B)).
267 Section 304 citizen suit enforcement was explicitly mentioned as being unavail-
able where a source is in compliance with an enforcement order. Id. No mention is made
of that section, however, when a source is not in compliance with such an order, although
specific mention is made of the availability of federal enforcement measures under section
113. On the face of the amendment standing alone, citizen suits' would appear to be
unavailable. Section 304, however, provides for commencement of a civil action: "against
any person . . .who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970). This language is broad enough to
include an enforcement order under the newly proposed subsection 113(d).
26 CoNF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1l1a (1976) (amending § 113(d)(3),
(4), (5)) provides for certain exceptional circumstances. For example, proposed section
113(d)(3) would appear to apply to older, obsolete plants where the "source intends to
comply by means of replacement of the facility, a complete change in production process,
or a termination of operation." These plants may operate until 1979 without the use of
any interim control measures, provided they post a bond which will be immediately for-
feited if the facility is not replaced, changed, or closed down.
Proposed section 113(d)(4) rewards innovative new production processes and control
techniques which will result in emissions reductions significantly greater than what is
presently required. Such facilities will have until January 1, 1981 to comply.
A special exception is also made under proposed section 113(d)(5) for major emitting
facilities which must convert to coal either to comply with 1974 amendments or because of
curtailment of natural gas supplies where such a conversion will result in violation of the
applicable implementation plan. Those sources have a final compliance date of July 1,
1980. In the interim, the state must prescribe emission limitations necessary to assure
that pollution levels will not exceed the national primary standard as a result of the
source's conversion to coal.
269 See note 263 supra and accompanying text.
"0 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 113(d)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(d)(10)).
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ever, nondiscretionary penalties will discourage further industry de-
lay.2 7 ' Section 119 of the proposed Conference Bill would require that
each enforcement order previously issued be amended by 1978 to provide
for a "delayed compliance penalty." This penalty would be imposed
automatically against any source not in compliance by the 1979 deadline
unless noncompliance is "entirely beyond the control of the owner or
operator."272 The penalty amount is to be computed by the states,
pursuant to guidelines issued by the Administrator, on the basis of in-
formation furnished by each source stating the type of continuous emis-
sion control technique which will be used by that source, the estimated
cost of compliance, including costs of obtaining financing, and the
estimated annual costs of operation and maintenance. 273 The total costs
over a normal amortization period of not more than ten years will be
assessed in equal monthly installments.2 74  The Administrator may
modify the amount if he finds it to be less than the amount which
would be required by the guidelines.
27 5
The penalty provision makes economic sense. The economic benefit
of delay will be eliminated, since it will cost industry less to comply
with the 1979 deadline than to seek further extensions. Even the provi-
sion for judicial review in district court states that a pending appeal of
the amount of penalty assessed will not stay the obligation to make the
monthly payments.2 76  The only loophole appears to be a challenge
on the grounds that noncompliance was entirely beyond the control of
the owner or operator. An appeal on those grounds may stay the
commencement of the monthly payments.2 7 7 The statutory language af-
fords no guidance as to what constitutes "entirely beyond the control."
The intent of the Act would seem to call for a strict construction of this
phrase so that industry cannot continue to claim the defenses of un-
availability of financing and technological infeasibility as something
entirely beyond their control. A restrictive interpretation by the courts
to include only embargoes, strikes, and other such events would appear
to be necessary in order to close this otherwise significant loophole.2 7 8
Another change in the federal enforcement provision amends section
113(b) to make the Administrator's duty to commence a suit for in-
27' CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 111(a) (1976) (adding § 119(a)).
Subsequent citations will refer to proposed section 119.
272 Id.
273 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 119(b)).
274 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 119(c)(2)(B)).
275 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 119(d)(1)).
276 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 119(e)(2)(A)).
277 Id. § 111(a) (proposed § 119(e)(2)(B)). Nevertheless, the owner or operator will be
required to post a bond equal to the amount of potential liability during the period of the
stay. If successful, the bond may be cancelled.
278 The broader House bill would have provided for extensions under many circum-
stances only one of which was that: "the necessary means of emission limitation is un-
available to such source by reason of an embargo, strike, or other event primarily beyond
the control of the owner or operator of the source." H.R. 10498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 103(a) (adding § 121(c)(1)(C) (1976).
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junctive relief and for civil penalties a mandatory one.2 79  Under the
1970 Act, while the Administrator had a nondiscretionary duty under
section 110(c) to promulgate a plan for a state that failed to submit
an adequate one, his enforcement responsibilities were stated to be
discretionary. The ramifications. of this change, if adopted, are diffi-
cult to predict. Violations of compliance orders pursuant to section
113(a), enforcement orders pursuant to proposed section 113(d), any
requirement of an applicable implementation plan during federally
assumed enforcement or upon thirty days notice are all among the pro-
visions the Administrator would have a mandatory duty to enforce.
280
V. CONCLUSION
In order to draw conclusions regarding the overall success or failure
of the Clean Air Act of 1970, it is necessary to review the congressional
intent behind the 1970 amendments and to measure against the stated
goals the actual progress that has been made in air pollution control.
There were two novel features in the 1970 legislation which were not
present in prior versions of the Act. The first was the shift from almost
exclusive reliance upon the states to lead the way in pollution control
to the present federal-state alliance. The second was the adoption of a
policy of "technology-forcing" instituted by the system of deadlines
and reinforced by the force of Congress' words that industry must either
meet the standards within the alloted time or be closed down. Each
of these additions in the 1970 Act have engendered the disputes pre-
viously discussed.
For the sake of uniformity, certain preliminary responsibilities were
delegated to the federal agency. The actual implementation was to be
the primary responsibility of state and local governments. Perhaps
because of an awareness that the state's role would be voluntary, Con-
gress provided that, in the event a state failed to cooperate in either
the development of a plan to implement the Act or in the enforcement
of that plan, a secondary back-up role would be assumed by the federal
agency. Initially it was agreed that a national minimum level of air
quality was necessary to protect the public health and welfare. Com-
petition for industry among the various states contributed significantly
to this decision. Without this minimal degree of federal involvement in
air pollution control, most would agree that many states would be no
further along the way to cleaner air than they were in 1970.
In contrast to the more or less accepted premise of the necessity of
national standards, the precise boundaries of federal versus state par-
ticipation have been the subject of much more constant dispute. It
279 CONF. REP. No. 1742, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 112 (1976) (amending § 113(b),
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970)) changes the language of § 113(b) from: "'[T]he Administrator
ray commence a civil action for appropriate relief, including a permanent or templorary
injunction" to "[t]he Administrator shall commeiice a civil action for appropriate relief,
including a permanent or temporary injunction, or to assess and recover a civil penalty of
not more than $10,000 per day of violation or both." (Emphasis added.) For a fuller dis-
cussion of the 1970 version see note 106 supra.
.,s Id. § 112 (proposed § 113(b)(1), (2), 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b)(1), (2)).
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now seems clear that the Federal Administrator, if called upon to pro-
mulgate a plan for a state that has failed to submit an acceptable plan,
has authority to promulgate a plan for the control of emissions only as
stringent as would be necessary to comply with the national standards.
However, when a state that has a plan which is more stringent than
necessary fails to enforce certain provisions, a question remains with
regard to the extent of the Administrator's authority to enforce that
provision. The most acceptable solution would appear to be the legis-
lative determination that a plan approved by the Administrator becomes
federal law and is thus enforceable by the federal agency. Whether a
state can be required to adopt and enforce a federally promulgated plan
is another issue which illustrates the truly delicate nature of the federal-
state relationship and the serious constitutional questions which may
arise. The upcoming resolution of this issue by the Supreme Court is
expected to confirm the voluntary nature of the state's cooperation in
the implementation and enforcement of pollution control plans, but it is
not anticipated that this will undermine the goal of assigning primary
responsibility to the states.
The technology-forcing aspects of the Clean Air Act may be even
more controversial than the increased federal participation. Resistance
by industry and reluctance on the part of the courts in the context of
sulfur dioxide compliance by stationary sources has been amply demon-
strated. The large numbers of air quality control regions which did not
attain the national primary standard by 1975 indicates not only the
resistance with which the Clean Air Act was met, but also the difficulty
of the task which Congress faced in 1970. Developments since 1970
have brought about a tremendous increase in the level of sophistica-
tion with which environmental control is approached. The new amend-
ments appear to recognize the need for some relaxation of the dead-
lines, but the proposed monetary penalties should insure attainment
before the end of this decade. The new approach is highly commend-
able from an economic standpoint, since it denies any competitive bene-
fit to those industries seeking to delay compliance. If these new en-
forcement measures become law and are imposed with diligence,
industry may come to view pollution control as an accepted cost of
doing business..
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